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Nota di contenuto	Front matter -- Table of Contents -- Preface: What is at Issue? -- Remarks on the Method and the Manner of this Book -- Chapter I: On Imagining -- Appendix to Chapter I: The German originals Appendix to Chapter I: The German originals of the quotations from Husserl and Wittgenstein in Chapter I, and remarks on matters of translation -- Chapter II: On Knowing the Inward Mental Life -- Appendix to Chapter II: The German originals of the quotations from Husserl and Wittgenstein in Chapter II, and remarks on matters of translation -- Chapter III: On Intending -- Appendix to Chapter III: The German originals of the quotations from Husserl and Wittgenstein in Chapter III, and remarks on matters of translation -- Chapter IV: On the Literature -- Appendix to Chapter IV: The German originals of the quotations from Husserl and Wittgenstein in Chapter IV, and remarks on matters of translation -- Bibliography -- Index of labelled quotations from Bennett & Hacker, Dennett, Husserl, Ryle, and Wittgenstein -- Index of other quoted authors
Sommario/riassunto	The phenomenological approach to the philosophy of mind, as inaugurated by Brentano and worked out in a very sophisticated way by Husserl, has been severely criticized by philosophers within the Wittgensteinian tradition and, implicitly, by Wittgenstein himself. Their

criticism is, in the epistemological regard, directed against introspectionism, and in the ontological regard, against an internalist and qualia-friendly, non-functionalist (or: broadly dualistic/idealistic) conception of the mind. The book examines this criticism in detail, looking at the writings of Wittgenstein, Ryle, Hacker, Dennett, and other authors, reconstructing their arguments, and pointing out where they fall short of their aim. In defending Husserl against his Wittgensteinian critics, the book also offers a comprehensive fresh view of phenomenology as a philosophy of mind. In particular, Husserl's non-representationalist theory of intentionality is carefully described in its various aspects and elucidated also with respect to its development, taking into account writings from various periods of Husserl's career. Last but not least, the book shows Wittgensteinianism to be one of the effective roots of the present-day hegemony of physicalism.

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