Record Nr. UNINA9910785162703321 Institutional design and voting power in the European Union [[electronic **Titolo** resource] /] / edited by Marek A. Cichocki and Karol Zyczkowski Pubbl/distr/stampa Farnham, Surrey;; Burlington, VT,: Ashgate, c2010 **ISBN** 1-315-58884-6 1-317-11581-3 1-317-11580-5 1-282-77385-2 9786612773853 0-7546-9496-8 Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (323 p.) Altri autori (Persone) ZyczkowskiKarol <1960-> CichockiMarek A Disciplina 324.6094 Soggetti Voting - European Union countries European Union countries Politics and government Lingua di pubblicazione Inglese **Formato** Materiale a stampa Livello bibliografico Monografia Description based upon print version of record. Note generali Nota di bibliografia Includes bibliographical references and index. Nota di contenuto Cover; Contents; List of Figures; List of Tables; List of Abbreviations; Notes on Contributors; Preface; Introduction; Part I Voting System for the Council of European Union; 1 Is the Double Majority Really Double? The Voting Rules in the Lisbon Treaty; 2 Penrose's Square-Root Rule and the EU Council of Ministers: Significance of the Quota; 3 Jagiellonian Compromise - An Alternative Voting System for the Council of the European Union; 4 The Double Majority Voting Rule of the EU Reform Treaty as a Democratic Ideal for an Enlarging Union: An Appraisal Using Voti 5 The Blocking Power in Voting Systems6 The Distribution of Power in the Council of Ministers of the European Union; Part II Distribution of Power in the European Union; 7 The Distribution of Power in the European Cluster Game; 8 The Constitutional Power of Voters in the European Parliament; 9 Decision Rules and Intergovernmentalism in the European Union: 10 On the Relative Unimportance of Voting Weights: Observations on Agenda-Based Voting Procedures; 11 Patterns of

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Sommario/riassunto

From leading global experts in the fields of politics and mathematics comes this thoughtful analysis of the nature and distribution of power within the European Union and the practical implications of the current institutional design on its members. A valuable resource for scholars of political science, European studies and law, as well as to those working on game theory, theory of voting, and applications of mathematics to social science.