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Titolo	Brute rationality : normativity and human action / / Joshua Gert [[electronic resource]]
Pubbl/distr/stampa	Cambridge : , : Cambridge University Press, , 2004
ISBN	1-107-14913-4 1-280-51612-7 0-511-21479-0 0-511-21658-0 0-511-21121-X 0-511-31536-8 0-511-48708-8 0-511-21298-4
Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (xiii, 230 pages) : digital, PDF file(s)
Collana	Cambridge studies in philosophy
Disciplina	128/.4
Soggetti	Normativity (Ethics) Decision making - Moral and ethical aspects
Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia
Note generali	Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
Nota di bibliografia	Includes bibliographical references (p. 221-225) and index.
Nota di contenuto	What would an adequate theory of rationality be like? -- Practical rationality, morality, and purely justificatory reasons -- The criticism from internalism about practical reasons -- A functional role analysis of reasons -- Accounting for our actual normative judgments -- Fitting the view into the contemporary debate -- Two concepts of rationality -- Internalism and different kinds of reasons -- Brute rationality.
Sommario/riassunto	This book presents an account of normative practical reasons and the way in which they contribute to the rationality of action. Rather than simply 'counting in favour of' actions, normative reasons play two logically distinct roles: requiring action and justifying action. The distinction between these two roles explains why some reasons do not seem relevant to the rational status of an action unless the agent cares about them, while other reasons retain all their force regardless of the agent's attitude. It also explains why the class of rationally permissible

action is wide enough to contain not only all morally required action, but also much selfish and immoral action. The book will appeal to a range of readers interested in practical reason in particular, and moral theory more generally.
