

1. Record Nr.	UNINA9910782995303321
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Titolo	Being known [[electronic resource] /] / Christopher Peacocke
Pubbl/distr/stampa	Oxford, : Clarendon Press Oxford ; ; New York, : Oxford University Press, 1999
ISBN	0-19-159819-4 1-281-98904-5 9786611989040 0-19-151946-4
Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (369 p.)
Disciplina	121
Soggetti	Knowledge, Theory of Metaphysics
Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia
Note generali	Description based upon print version of record.
Nota di bibliografia	Includes bibliographical references and index.
Nota di contenuto	<p>           ""Preface""; ""Contents""; ""1 The Integration Challenge""; ""2 Truth, Content, and the Epistemic""; ""2.1 The Linking Thesis""; ""2.2 Consequences of the Argument for the Linking Thesis""; ""2.3 The Linking Thesis and the Integration Challenge""; ""2.4 Three Indicators for Solutions""; ""2.5 A Look Ahead: Two Styles of Solution""; ""Appendix. Factive Reasons and Taking a Representational State at Face Value""; ""3 The Past""; ""3.1 The Property-Identity Link and its Role in Understanding""; ""3.2 Past-Tense Truth: Some Metaphysics"" ""3.3 Externalist Elements in Understanding the Past Tense"" ""3.4 Memory and the Property-Identity Link""; ""3.5 a€?The Explanation by Means of Identity Does Not Work Herea€?: When and How It Does""; ""3.6 Realism, Metaphysics, and the Theory of Meaning""; ""3.7 Final Observations on the Temporal Case""; ""4 Necessity""; ""4.1 Problems and Goals""; ""4.2 Admissibility, the Principles of Possibility, and the Modal Extension Principle""; ""4.3 Other Principles of Possibility and the Truth Conditions of Modal Statements""; ""4.4 Modalism, Understanding, Reduction"" ""4.5 The Epistemology of Metaphysical Necessity"" ""4.6 Against the Thinker-Dependence of Necessity""; ""4.7 Neo-Wittgensteinian         </p>

Challenges"; "4.8 Conclusion and Prospects"; "Appendix A. Modal Logic and the Principle-Based Conception"; "Appendix B. Relaxing the Assumptions"; "5 Self-Knowledge and Intentional Content"; "5.1 Conscious Attitudes, Self-Ascription, and the Occupation of Attention"; "5.2 First Steps towards a Solution: Rational Sensitivity without Inference"; "5.3 Between Internal Introspectionism and a€?No-Reasonsa€? Accounts"; "5.4 Why do these Self-Ascriptions Amount to Knowledge?"; "5.5 Conceptual Redeployment: Supporting the Claim"; "5.6 Three Consequences of Redeployment"; "6 Self-Knowledge and Illusions of Transcendence"; "6.1 Representational Independence"; "6.2 Delta Theories"; "6.3 Representational Independence Outside the First Person?"; "6.4 An Illusion and its Source"; "6.5 Self-Knowledge, Subjectlessness, and Reductionist Views"; "7 Freedom"; "7.1 The Classical Problem and the Integration Challenge"; "7.2 An Intuitive Characterization of Freedom"; "7.3 a€?Could Have Done Otherwisea€?: The Closeness Account"; "7.4 A Puzzling Inference"; "7.5 The Closeness Conception Elaborated"; "7.6 Non-Theoretical Construals of Freedom"; "7.7 Libertarianism"; "7.8 The Epistemology of Freedom"; "7.9 Neither Too Much nor Too Little?"; "8 Concluding Remarks"; "Bibliography"; "Index"; "A"; "B"; "C"; "D"; "E"; "F"; "G"; "H"; "I"; "J"; "K"; "L"; "M"; "N"; "O"; "P"; "Q"; "R"; "S"; "T"; "U"; "V"; "W"; "Y"; "Z"

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Sommario/riassunto

Christopher Peacocke examines the problem of knowing whether human beings can really know about the past, about what they are thinking, about what might be and whether freedom is really possible.

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