

1. Record Nr.	UNINA9910781937903321
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Titolo	Mobilizing restraint [[electronic resource]] : democracy and industrial conflict in postreform South Asia // Emmanuel Teitelbaum
Pubbl/distr/stampa	Ithaca, : ILR Press, 2011
ISBN	0-8014-6336-X 0-8014-6335-1
Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (241 p.)
Collana	Cornell paperbacks
Disciplina	331.880954
Soggetti	Employee rights - South Asia Labor unions - South Asia Conflict management - South Asia
Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia
Note generali	Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph
Nota di bibliografia	Includes bibliographical references and index.
Nota di contenuto	Frontmatter -- Contents -- Tables and Figures -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations -- 1. Introduction: The Political Management of Industrial Conflict -- Part I. A Puzzle and an Argument -- Part II. The Evidence -- Appendix A. Survey Methods and Response Rates -- Appendix B. Labor Law Coding -- Notes -- Works Cited -- Index
Sommario/riassunto	In Mobilizing Restraint, Emmanuel Teitelbaum argues that, contrary to conventional wisdom, democracies are better at managing industrial conflict than authoritarian regimes. This is because democracies have two unique tools at their disposal for managing worker protest: mutually beneficial union-party ties and worker rights. By contrast, authoritarian governments have tended to repress unions and to sever mutually beneficial ties to organized labor. Many of the countries that fall between these two extremes-from those that have only the trappings of democracy to those that have imperfectly implemented democratic reforms-exert control over labor in the absence of overt repression but without the robust organizational and institutional capacity enjoyed by full-fledged democracies. Based on the recent history of industrial conflict and industrial peace in South Asia, Teitelbaum argues that the political exclusion and repression of

organized labor commonly witnessed in authoritarian and hybrid regimes has extremely deleterious effects on labor relations and ultimately economic growth. To test his arguments, Teitelbaum draws on an array of data, including his original qualitative interviews and survey evidence from Sri Lanka and three Indian states—Kerala, Maharashtra, and West Bengal. He also analyzes panel data from fifteen Indian states to evaluate the relationship between political competition and worker protest and to study the effects of protective labor legislation on economic performance. In Teitelbaum's view, countries must undergo further political liberalization before they are able to replicate the success of the sophisticated types of growth-enhancing management of industrial protest seen throughout many parts of South Asia.
