

1. Record Nr.	UNINA9910781564903321
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Titolo	The mediation dilemma [[electronic resource] /] / Kyle Beardsley
Pubbl/distr/stampa	Ithaca, : Cornell University Press, 2011
ISBN	0-8014-6262-2 0-8014-6261-4
Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (252 p.)
Collana	Cornell studies in security affairs
Disciplina	327.1/7
Soggetti	Mediation, International Conflict management Peace-building Diplomatic negotiations in international disputes Pacific settlement of international disputes
Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia
Note generali	Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph
Nota di bibliografia	Includes bibliographical references and index.
Nota di contenuto	The dilemma -- Negotiating mediation -- Why accept mediation? -- Raison d'etre : short-term benefits of mediation -- The struggle for self-enforcing peace -- Mediation in intrastate conflicts -- Implications, applications, and conclusions.
Sommario/riassunto	Mediation has become a common technique for terminating violent conflicts both within and between states; while mediation has a strong record in reducing hostilities, it is not without its own problems. In The Mediation Dilemma, Kyle Beardsley highlights its long-term limitations. The result of this oft-superficial approach to peacemaking, immediate and reassuring as it may be, is often a fragile peace. With the intervention of a third-party mediator, warring parties may formally agree to concessions that are insupportable in the long term and soon enough find themselves at odds again. Beardsley examines his argument empirically using two data sets and traces it through several historical cases: Henry Kissinger's and Jimmy Carter's initiatives in the Middle East, 1973-1979; Theodore Roosevelt's 1905 mediation in the Russo-Japanese War; and Carter's attempt to mediate in the 1994 North Korean nuclear crisis. He also draws upon the lessons of the 1993 Arusha Accords, the 1993 Oslo Accords, Haiti in 1994, the 2002

Ceasefire Agreement in Sri Lanka, and the 2005 Memorandum of Understanding in Aceh. Beardsley concludes that a reliance on mediation risks a greater chance of conflict relapse in the future, whereas the rejection of mediation risks ongoing bloodshed as war continues. The trade-off between mediation's short-term and long-term effects is stark when the third-party mediator adopts heavy-handed forms of leverage, and, Beardsley finds, multiple mediators and intergovernmental organizations also do relatively poorly in securing long-term peace. He finds that mediation has the greatest opportunity to foster both short-term and long-term peace when a single third party mediates among belligerents that can afford to wait for a self-enforcing arrangement to be reached.

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