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                       OF FUNCTIONAL SUB-TYPES -- 7. REDUCTION OF PSYCHOLOGY TO
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   Sommario/riassunto This book explores the mind-body issue from both the perspectives of
                       philosophy of mind and philosophy of science. Starting from the
                       problem of mental causation, it provides an overview of the
                       contemporary metaphysical discussion and argues in favour of the
                       token-identity thesis, as the only position that can account for the
                       causal efficacy of the mental. Showing furthermore that this ontological
                       reductionism is not dissociable from epistemological reductionism, the
                       author applies a new strategy of inter-theoretic reduction, which is
                       compatible with the multiple realizability of mental properties. Using
                       functionally defined sub-types, this account establishes a conservative
                       reduction of psychology to neuroscience, which vindicates both the
                       scientific legitimacy and the theoretical indispensability of psychology.
                       This account is illustrated by several empirical examples borrowed

from contemporary neuroscience.