Record Nr. UNINA9910779267903321 Institutions and incentives in regulatory science [[electronic resource] /] **Titolo** / edited by Jason Scott Johnston Pubbl/distr/stampa Lanham, Md.,: Lexington Books, 2012 **ISBN** 1-280-66651-X 9786613643445 0-7391-6947-5 Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (233 p.) Altri autori (Persone) JohnstonJason Scott Disciplina 363.7/05610973 Environmental policy - United States Soggetti Environmental agencies - United States Environmental protection - Standards - United States Environmental law - United States Environmental sciences - Political aspects - United States Science and state - United States Lingua di pubblicazione Inglese **Formato** Materiale a stampa Livello bibliografico Monografia Description based upon print version of record. Note generali Nota di bibliografia Includes bibliographical references and index. Nota di contenuto Introduction / Jason Scott Johnston -- The cost of cartelization : the ipcc process and the crisis of credibility in climate science / Jason Scott Johnston -- Adversarial versus consensus processes for assessing scientific evidence: should the IPCC operate more like a courtroom? / Ross McKitrick -- On the origin of specious species / Rob Roy Ramey II -- Politics and science in endangered species / Katrina Miriam Wyman -- Reconciling the scientific & regulatory timetables / James W. Conrad, Jr -- Improving the use of science to inform environmental regulation / Susan E. Dudley and George M. Gray -- A return to expertise? : a proposal for an institute of scientific assessments / Gary E. Marchant. Institutions and Incentives in Regulatory Science explores fundamental Sommario/riassunto problems with regulatory science in the environmental and natural resource law field. Each chapter covers a variety of natural resource and regulatory areas, ranging from climate change to endangered species protection and traditional health-based environmental regulation. The

contributors in this volume address how institutions for regulatory

science should be designed in light of the inevitable misfit between the political or legal demand for regulatory action an