

1. Record Nr.	UNINA9910779004003321
Autore	Moosbrugger Lorelei K
Titolo	The vulnerability thesis [[electronic resource]] : interest group influence and institutional design // Lorelei K. Moosbrugger
Pubbl/distr/stampa	New Haven, : Yale University Press, c2012
ISBN	1-280-77053-8 9786613681300 0-300-16758-X
Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (288 p.)
Disciplina	322.4/3
Soggetti	Majorities Pressure groups Representative government and representation
Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia
Note generali	Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph
Nota di bibliografia	Includes bibliographical references and index.
Nota di contenuto	Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- 1. Interest Group Influence And Institutional Design -- 2. The Vulnerability Thesis -- 3. Evidence From The Environment -- 4. The European Union -- 5. The United Kingdom: Minority Influence And Majority Rule -- 6. Germany: The Politics Of Paying The Polluter -- 7. Austria: Political Cover And Policy Choice -- 8. Sweden: Minority Representation And The Majority Interest -- 9. Institutional Design And The Quality Of Democracy -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index
Sommario/riassunto	Where politics is dominated by two large parties, as in the United States, politicians should be relatively immune to the influence of small groups. Yet narrow interest groups often win private benefits against majority preferences and at great public expense. Why? The "vulnerability thesis" is that the electoral system is largely to blame, making politicians in two-party systems more vulnerable to interest group demands than politicians in multiparty systems. Political scientist Lorelei Moosbrugger ranks democracies on a continuum of political vulnerability and tests the thesis by examining agrochemical policy in Austria, Britain, Germany, Sweden, and the European Union.

