

1. Record Nr.	UNINA9910778268303321
Autore	Walton Douglas N.
Titolo	Witness testimony evidence : argumentation, artificial intelligence, and law / / Douglas Walton [[electronic resource]]
Pubbl/distr/stampa	Cambridge : , : Cambridge University Press, , 2008
ISBN	1-107-18504-1 9786611146405 0-511-36717-1 1-281-14640-4 0-511-36655-8 0-511-36592-6 0-511-57419-3 0-511-61953-7 0-511-36776-7
Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (xvii, 365 pages) : digital, PDF file(s)
Disciplina	347/.066
Soggetti	Law - Methodology Witnesses Evidence (Law) Reasoning Artificial intelligence Relevance (Philosophy)
Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia
Note generali	Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
Nota di bibliografia	Includes bibliographical references (p. 339-351) and index.
Nota di contenuto	Cover; Half-title; Title; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Introduction; List of Figures and Tables; Acknowledgments; 1 Witness Testimony as Argumentation; 2 Plausible Reasoning in Legal Argumentation; 3 Scripts, Stories, and Anchored Narratives; 4 Computational Dialectics; 5 Witness Examination as Peirastic Dialogue; 6 Applying Dialectical Models to the Trial; 7 Supporting and Attacking Witness Testimony; Bibliography; Index
Sommario/riassunto	Recent work in artificial intelligence has increasingly turned to argumentation as a rich, interdisciplinary area of research that can

provide new methods related to evidence and reasoning in the area of law. Douglas Walton provides an introduction to basic concepts, tools and methods in argumentation theory and artificial intelligence as applied to the analysis and evaluation of witness testimony. He shows how witness testimony is by its nature inherently fallible and sometimes subject to disastrous failures. At the same time such testimony can provide evidence that is not only necessary but inherently reasonable for logically guiding legal experts to accept or reject a claim. Walton shows how to overcome the traditional disdain for witness testimony as a type of evidence shown by logical positivists, and the views of trial sceptics who doubt that trial rules deal with witness testimony in a way that yields a rational decision-making process.
