Record Nr. UNINA9910777632903321 Antitrust policy and vertical restraints [[electronic resource] /] / Robert **Titolo** W. Hahn, editor Pubbl/distr/stampa Washington, D.C., : AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, c2006 **ISBN** 0-8157-3392-5 Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (107 p.) Altri autori (Persone) HahnRobert William 338.82 Disciplina Competition Soggetti Commodity control Tie-ins (Marketing) Monopolies Antitrust law Lingua di pubblicazione Inalese **Formato** Materiale a stampa Livello bibliografico Monografia Note generali Description based upon print version of record. Nota di bibliografia Includes bibliographical references and index. Nota di contenuto Introduction / Robert W. Hahn -- Two tales of bundling: implications for the application of antitrust law to bundled discounts / Bruce H. Kobayashi -- Why tie an essential good? / Dennis W. Carlton and Michael Waldman -- Tying: the poster child for antitrust modernization / David S. Evans. Sommario/riassunto Antitrust law is intended to protect consumer welfare and foster competition. At first glance, however, it is often unclear whether certain business practices have positive or detrimental effects. Businesses frequently engage in activities that may appear anticompetitive on the surface, but are actually beneficial to consumers. Business tying practices, for example, make the sale of one product conditional upon the sale of another product. This practice can either deprive consumers of choice and drive up prices or lower costs and improve convenience. Therefore, it is critical that policymakers