Record Nr.	UNINA9910766882903321
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Titolo	Industrial Organization : Practice Exercises with Answer Keys / / Pak- Sing Choi, Eric Dunaway, and Felix Munoz-Garcia
Pubbl/distr/stampa	Cham, Switzerland : , : Springer, , [2023] ©2023
ISBN	3-031-38635-3
Edizione	[Second edition.]
Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (680 pages)
Collana	Springer Texts in Business and Economics Series
Disciplina	354.81150006
Soggetti	Industrial organization (Economic theory)
Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia
Nota di bibliografia	Includes bibliographical references and index.
Nota di contenuto	Intro Preface Acknowledgements Contents 1 Monopoly Introduction Exercise #1.1: Monopoly with Linear CostsA Exercise #1.2: Monopoly with Convex CostsA Exercise #1.3: Monopolist with Linear Inverse Demand and Generic Cost FunctionB Exercise #1.4: Convex, Concave, and Linear Demand in MonopolyC Exercise #1.5: Maximizing Revenue or Maximizing Profit?A Exercise #1.6: Learning-by-Doing and Commitment in MonopolyB Exercise #1.7: Monopolist Serving Two Interdependent MarketsB Exercise #1.8: Multiplant Monopolist-IA Exercise #1.9: Multiplant Monopolist Serving Two Separated Markets-IA Exercise #1.12: Monopolist Serving Two Separated Markets-IA Exercise #1.12: Monopolist Serving Two Separated Markets-IIA Exercise #1.13: Geographical Price DiscriminationB Exercise #1.14: Two-Part PricingA Exercise #1. 15: Monopoly Facing Entry Threats - Based on Tirole1988C Exercise #1.16: Multiproduct Monopoly with Economies of ScopeB Exercise #1.17: Vertical Differentiation and Natural MonopolyB Exercise #1. 18: Persuasive Advertising in MonopolyB Exercise #1.19: Informative Advertising in MonopolyB Exercise #1.20: Behavior-Based Price Discrimination in MonopolyB Exercise #2.21: Cournot Duopoly with Symmetric CostsA Exercise #2.2: Cournot Duopoly - Necessary and Sufficient ConditionsB Exercise #2.3: Cournot Oligopoly with Three Symmetric

1.

FirmsA -- Exercise #2.4: Cournot Oligopoly with N2 Symmetric FirmsB -- Exercise #2.5: Comparing Equilibrium and Socially Optimal Outputs Under Cournot CompetitionB -- Exercise #2.6: Cournot Pricing Formula - DerivationA -- Exercise #2.7: Cournot Pricing Formula -ApplicationA -- Exercise #2.8: Cournot Pricing Formula - Parametric ExampleA.

Exercise #2.9: Cournot Duopoly with Asymmetric Marginal CostsA --Exercise #2.10: Cournot Competition with n Firms Facing Asymmetric CostsC -- Exercise #2.11: Cournot with Only One Firm Benefiting from a Cost AdvantageB -- Exercise #2.12: Social Welfare with Cost-Symmetric Firms Selling Heterogeneous Goods and Competing in QuantitiesA -- Exercise #2.13: Cournot Competition with Heterogeneous GoodsA -- Exercise #2.14: Cournot Competition with N2 Asymmetric Firms Allowing for Product DifferentiationB --Exercise #2.15: Cournot Competition with N2 Asymmetric Firms Allowing for Product Differentiation: MergerB -- Exercise #2.16: Cournot Competition with N2 Asymmetric Firms Allowing for Product Differentiation: Merger IncentivesB -- Exercise #2.17: Social Welfare with Cost-Asymmetric Firms Selling Heterogeneous Goods and Competing in QuantitiesA -- Exercise #2.18: Entry that Reduces Aggregate OutputA -- Exercise #2.19: Cournot with Asymmetric Fixed CostsB -- Exercise #2.20: Can Fewer Firms Decrease Prices?B --Exercise #2.21: Cournot with Equity Shares - Based on Reynolds1986B -- Exercise #2.22: Cournot Competition Between a Private and a Public FirmB -- Exercise #2.23: Cournot Competition Between N Private Firms and a Public FirmB -- Exercise #2.24: Managerial Incentives in Cournot - Based on Fershtman1987C -- Exercise #2.25: Cournot Competition Under Incomplete Information-IB -- Exercise #2.26: Cournot Competition Under Incomplete Information-IIC -- Exercise #2.27: Cournot Competition Under Incomplete Information-IIIC -- Exercise #2. 28: Cournot Competition When Firms Are Asymmetrically Informed of Product DifferentiationB -- Exercise #2.29: Nonlinear Pricing in Oligopoly - Based on Harrison2001C -- 3 Simultaneous Price Competition -- Introduction -- Exercise #3.1: Price Competition with Homogeneous Products and Symmetric CostsA. Exercise #3.2: Price Competition with Homogeneous Products and Asymmetric CostsA -- Exercise #3.3: Price Competition with Price-Matching GuaranteesB -- Exercise #3.4: Price Competition with Heterogeneous Goods and Symmetric CostsA -- Exercise #3.5: Price Competition with Heterogeneous Goods and Asymmetric CostsB --Exercise #3.6: Price Competition with Homogeneous Goods and Uncertain CostsC -- Exercise #3.7: Price Competition with Heterogeneous Goods and Uncertain CostsB -- Exercise #3.8: Entry-Deterring PricesC -- Exercise #3.9: Using Capacity Constraints to Reconcile Bertrand and Cournot ModelsC -- Exercise #3.10: Generalized Hotelling ModelA -- Exercise #3.11: Hotelling Model of Horizontal Product DifferentiationA -- Exercise #3.12: Hotelling with Asymmetric Transportation CostsB -- Exercise #3.13: Socially Optimal Location in Hotelling ModelB -- Exercise #3.14: Hotelling with Nonuniformly Distributed Consumers.C -- Exercise #3.15: Salop Circle of Horizontal Product DifferentiationB -- Exercise #3.16: Horizontal Differentiation in Two Dimensions, Based on Irmean1998C -- Exercise #3.17: Vertical Differentiation, Quality Choice, and Price CompetitionB -- Exercise #3.18: Products Horizontally and Vertically DifferentiatedC -- 4 Sequential Competition -- Introduction -- Exercise #4.1: Stackelberg Competition with Two Symmetric FirmsA -- Exercise #4.2: Stackelberg Competition with Three Symmetric FirmsB -- Exercise #4.3: Stackelberg Competition with Two Asymmetric FirmsB -- Exercise #4.4:

Stackelberg Competition, General PresentationC -- Exercise #4.5: Stackelberg Competition Between a Private Leader and a Public FollowerB -- Exercise #4.6: Stackelberg Competition Between a Public Leader and a Private FollowerB -- Exercise #4.7: Stackelberg Competition Under Incomplete Information - Uninformed LeaderB. Exercise #4.8: Stackelberg with Demand Shocks, Based on Liu2005B --Exercise #4.9: Stackelberg Competition Under Incomplete Information -Uninformed FollowerC -- Exercise #4.10: Hybrid Competition - Leader Choosing Output and Follower Choosing PriceB -- Exercise #4.11: Stackelberg Competition with m Leaders, Based on Huck2001C --Exercise #4.12: Sequential Price Competition with Homogeneous GoodsA -- Exercise #4.13: Sequential Price Competition with Heterogeneous GoodsB -- Exercise #4.14: Committing in Prices or Quantities, Based on Singh1984B -- Exercise #4.15: Strategic Precommitment by Only One Firm Followed by Cournot Competition, Based on Fudenberg1984B -- Exercise #4.16: Strategic Pre-commitment by Only One Firm Followed by Bertrand CompetitionB -- Exercise #4.17: Strategic Pre-commitment by Both FirmsB -- 5 Regulating Imperfectly Competitive Markets -- Introduction -- Exercise #5.1: Regulating a Monopolist Under Complete InformationA -- Exercise #5.2: Regulating a Polluting MonopolyB -- Exercise #5.3: Regulating a Monopolist Under Complete Information - Pigouvian EPAA -- Exercise #5.4: Regulating a Natural MonopolistA -- Exercise #5.5: Regulating a Monopolist Under Incomplete Information-IB -- Exercise #5.6: Regulating a Monopolist Under Incomplete Information-IIC -- Exercise #5.7: Regulating a Cournot OligopolyA -- Exercise #5.8: Regulating a Polluting Cournot OligopolyB -- Exercise #5.9: Regulating a Polluting Cournot Oligopoly Under Complete Information - Pigouvian EPAB -- Exercise #5.10: Regulating Polluting Firms That Compete à la StackelbergB -- Exercise #5.11: Endogenous Entry DecisionsB -- Exercise #5.12: Tax Incidence in MonopolyC -- 6 R& -- D Incentives -- Introduction -- Exercise #6.1: Incentives to Innovate Under MonopolyA -- Exercise #6.2: Quantity Competition: More Incentives to Innovate Than Under Monopoly?B.

Exercise #6.3: Price Competition: Less Incentives to Innovate Under Monopoly?B -- Exercise #6.4: Larger R& -- D Under Monopoly or Duopoly? Welfare EvaluationC -- Exercise #6.5: More Competitive Industries and R& -- D InvestmentC -- Exercise #6.6: Research Joint Ventures in R& -- DB -- Exercise #6.7: Research Joint Ventures in R& -- D When Firms Compete in PricesB -- Exercise #6.8: Spillover Effects in R& -- D InvestmentB -- Exercise #6.9: Two Firms Sequentially Developing New ProductsB -- Exercise #6.10: Green Innovation. Based on Lambertini2017C -- Exercise #6.11: Incentives to Innovate in Cournot, Based on Delbono1991C -- Exercise #6.12: Cost-Reducing Investments That Accommodate EntryB --Exercise #6.13: Cost-Reducing Investments That Deter EntryB --Exercise #6.14: Is Entry Deterrence Profitable?B -- Exercise #6.15: Optimal Patent Length, Based on Takalo2001C -- Exercise #6.16: Optimal Patent Length, An ApplicationB -- 7 Mergers -- Introduction -- Exercise #7.1: Mergers Between Two FirmsA -- Exercise #7.2: Mergers Between n2 Firms, Based on Salant1983B -- Exercise #7.3: Unsustainable MergersA -- Exercise #7.4: Bertrand Mergers with Differentiated ProductsB -- Exercise #7.5: Cournot Mergers with Differentiated Products and Symmetric CostsB -- Exercise #7.6: Cournot Mergers with Differentiated Products and Asymmetric Costs, Based on Gelves2014C -- Exercise #7.7: Cartels with SynergiesB --Exercise #7.8: Merger to Gain Economies of ScopeB -- Exercise #7.9: Merger to Gain Stackelberg LeadershipB -- Exercise #7.10: Merger

Between a Leader and Follower, Based on Huck2001C -- Exercise #7. 11: The ``Tragedy of the Anticommons," Heller1998B -- Exercise #7. 12: Mergers in Polluting Markets, Based on Fikru2016C -- 8 Collusion -- Introduction -- Exercise #8.1: Collusion with Two Firms Competing à la CournotB. Exercise #8.2: Collusion with n Firms Competing à la CournotC.