1. Record Nr. UNINA9910467321103321

Autore	Philip Marlene Nourbese <1947-, >
Titolo	Blank : interviews and essays / / M. Nourbese Philip
Pubbl/distr/stampa	[Place of publication not identified] : , : BookThug, , 2017 ©2017
ISBN	1-77166-307-3 1-77166-308-1
Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (348 pages)
Collana	Essais ; ; Number 3
Disciplina	824.008
Soggetti	English essays Electronic books.
Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia

2. Record Nr. UNINA9910715393303321

Autore	Keeney Michelle
Titolo	Insider threat study : computer system sabotage in critical infrastructure sectors / / Michelle Keeney [and six others]
Pubbl/distr/stampa	Washington, DC : , : United States Secret Service, , 2005
Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (45 pages)
Soggetti	Computer networks - Security measures - United States Law enforcement - United States Computer networks - Security measures Law enforcement United States
Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia
Note generali	"May 2005."
Nota di bibliografia	Includes bibliographical references.
Nota di contenuto	Introduction -- Prevalence of incidents of insider sabotage -- The insider threat study -- Characteristics of insider sabotage across critical infrastructure sectors -- Insider characteristics -- Organization characteristics -- Consequences to insiders -- Key findings of the insider threat study of sabotage across critical infrastructure sectors -- The insider's motive -- Pre-attack behavior and planning -- Advancing the attack -- Detecting the attack -- Consequences for targeted organizations -- Implications of the key findings for the prevention of insider sabotage -- The insider's motive -- Pre-attack behavior and planning -- Advancing the attack -- Detecting the attack -- Consequences for target organizations -- Conclusion: Reflections on the findings for the prevention of insider sabotage.
Sommario/riassunto	A new report from the Secret Service and the Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute's CERT found that most acts of insider sabotage on computer systems in critical infrastructure sectors were perpetrated by former employees--motivated at least in part by a desire to seek revenge--who were granted system administrator or privileged access when hired.