

1. Record Nr.	UNINA9910696205703321
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Titolo	Force and restraint in strategic deterrence [[electronic resource] ] : a game-theorist's perspective // Roger B. Myerson
Pubbl/distr/stampa	[Carlisle Barracks, PA] : , : [Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College], , [2007]
Descrizione fisica	vi, 25 pages : digital, PDF file
Collana	Advancing strategic thought series
Soggetti	Deterrence (Strategy) Game theory Games of strategy (Mathematics) International relations Deterrence (Strategy) - Mathematical models
Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia
Note generali	Title from title screen (viewed on Dec. 7, 2007). "November 2007."
Nota di bibliografia	Includes bibliographical references (page 25).
Nota di contenuto	Intuitive arguments against multilateral constraints on American actions -- Game theory as a form of analytical narrative -- A simple model of the strategic deterrence problem -- Judging reputations -- Reputations for restraint and resolve -- Failure of deterrence: stimulating militarism by denying restraint -- Reconsidering the rationality assumption -- Lessons for patriots.
Sommario/riassunto	"In a dangerous world, we need to think very carefully about how military force is used. Game theory can serve us in such analyses by providing a framework for probing the inextricable connections between our adversaries' decision problems and our own. To illustrate the power of game theory, the author focuses on a vital question that confronts American policymakers today: what determines why an application of military force, which was intended to deter potential adversaries, sometimes instead stimulates them to more militant reactions against us? When we feel that force is necessary, what can we do to minimize the risk of such adverse reactions?" -- p. v.

