

| | |
|-------------------------|---|
| 1. Record Nr. | UNINA9910637789203321 |
| Titolo | From warlords to statelords : armed groups and power trajectories in Libya and Yemen // edited by Eleonora Ardemagni, Federica Saini Fasanotti ; introduction by Paolo Magri |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Milan, Italy : , : Ledizioni, , [2022] ©2022 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (126 pages) : maps |
| Disciplina | 364.13 |
| Soggetti | Warlordism Libya Politics and government Yemen (Republic) Politics and government |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | Inglese |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Nota di contenuto | Introduction, Paolo Magri - ISPI Executive Vice President -- 1. Libya and Yemen's warlords: neopatrimonialism under a new guise. Eleonora Ardemagni - ISPI and Catholic University of Milan -- 2. The lords of war in the changing geopolitical system. Vanda Felbab-Brown - Brookings Institution -- 3. Armed groups, oil revenue and energy infrastructure -- 3.1 Libya's Shadow Statelords: War, Peace and the Predation of the Oil Sector, Anas El-Gomati - Sadeq Institute -- 3.2 Old Elites and New Armed Groups: The Scramble Over Yemen's Oil Reserves Continues, Ahmed al-Shargabi, Mareike Transfeld - Yemen Policy Center 4. Armed groups, smuggling and illicit trafficking -- 4.1 The Lifeblood of Libya: Armed Groups' Normalisation of a Thriving Smuggling Economy, Amanda B. Kadlec - King's College London -- 4.2. Yemen: Militarised Borders Strengthen Smuggling Networks, Ahmed Nagi - Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center -- 5. Libya and Yemen's governance of maritime boundaries -- 5.1 How Mafiasation Destabilises Libya's Economy and Migration Control, Tarek Megerisi - European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) -- 5.2 Yemen's Coastal Lords: The Economics of "Multi-Governed" Maritime Boundaries, Eleonora Ardemagni - ISPI and Catholic University of Milan -- Conclusions: How militias became proto-governments. Federica Saini Fasanotti - ISPI and Brookings |

Sommario/riassunto

Armed groups play a central role in Libya and Yemen. Pervading weak and contested institutions, they have gradually brought their survival, profit and governance strategies under the state umbrella: warlords have become the new lords of the state. Armed groups control most of the energy revenues, critical infrastructure, smuggling and illicit trafficking. Their leaders are multifaceted: they are simultaneously military commanders, tribal chiefs, politicians and businessmen. Combining comparative analysis and case studies, this Report sheds light on the "economic face" of the armed groups and their power trajectories. How do armed groups build networks of profit and loyalty in the territories they hold? How does clientelism mark a continuity trend with former authoritarian regimes?
