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Autore	Marshall Robert C. <1956->
Titolo	The economics of collusion [[electronic resource]] : cartels and bidding rings / / Robert C. Marshall and Leslie M. Marx
Pubbl/distr/stampa	Cambridge, Mass., : MIT Press, c2012
ISBN	0-262-30073-7 1-280-49893-5 9786613594167 0-262-30150-4
Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (315 p.)
Altri autori (Persone)	Marx Leslie M. <1967->
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Soggetti	Price fixing Cartels Competition Electronic books.
Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia
Note generali	Description based upon print version of record.
Nota di bibliografia	Includes bibliographical references and indexes.
Nota di contenuto	""Contents""; ""Preface""; ""Chapter 1. Introduction""; ""1.1 Motivating Example""; ""1.2 Collusion within Porter's Five Forces""; ""1.3 Difficulties of Collusion""; ""1.4 Environments Requiring Explicit Collusion""; ""1.5 Lingering Price Effects of Explicit Collusion""; ""1.6 Price Formation Process""; ""1.7 Economic Rationale for the Illegality of Explicit Collusion""; ""1.8 Cartel Detection""; ""1.9 Outline of the Book""; ""1.10 Appendix: Factors Affecting the Sustainability of Tacit Collusion""; ""Part I. Collusion in Practice""; ""Chapter 2. Narrative of a Cartel"" ""2.1 The Story Begins""""2.2 Initiation of the Cartel""; ""2.3 Market Share Division""; ""2.4 Price Increases and Announcements""; ""2.5 Sales Force Issues""; ""2.6 Redistributions""; ""2.7 Questions and Answers""; ""Chapter 3. Narrative of a Bidding Ring""; ""3.1 Preamble""; ""3.2 The Instruction Begins""; ""3.3 Two Motivations for the Ring""; ""3.4 Ring Logistics""; ""3.5 Ring Membership""; ""3.6 Auctioneer's Response""; ""3.7 Implementation of Sidepayments""; ""3.8 Questions and Answers""; ""Chapter 4. Narrative of Cartel Detection""; ""4.1

Preamble"; "4.2 The Seminar Begins"

"4.3 Taxonomy of Cartel Actions"""; "4.4 Economic Evidence of Collusion"; "4.5 Questions and Answers"; "Part II. Economics of Cartels"; "Chapter 5. Suppression of Rivalry by Cartels"; "5.1 Basics"; "5.2 Buyer Resistance"; "5.3 Model of Price Competition without Buyer Resistance"; "5.4 Collusive Outcomes"; "5.5 Incentives for Cheating"; "5.6 Conclusion"; "Chapter 6. Implementation of Collusion by Cartels"; "6.1 The Central Cartel Problem and the Solution"; "6.2 Pricing Structures"; "6.3 Allocation Structures"; "6.4 Enforcement Structures"; "6.5 Conclusion"  
"6.6 Appendix: Third-Party Facilitation"""; "Chapter 7. Beyond the Suppression of Within-cartel Rivalry"; "7.1 Sharing Mutually Beneficial Investments"; "7.2 A Dominant Firm versus a Cartel Acting as a Dominant Firm"; "7.3 Direct Actions against Noncartel Firms"; "7.4 Perimeter Forces"; "7.5 Sixth Force of Government"; "7.6 Conclusion"; "7.7 Appendix: Antitrust Exemptions"; "Part III. Economics of Bidding Rings"; "Chapter 8. Suppression of Interbidder Rivalry by Rings"; "8.1 Role of Auctions and Procurements in Price Discovery"; "8.2 Suppression of Rivalry at an Auction"  
"8.3 Ring Composition"; "8.4 Effects of Auction Format and Ring Size"; "8.5 Conclusion"; "8.6 Appendix A: Numerical Example of Leakage at a Sealed-Bid Auction"; "8.7 Appendix B: Numerical Example of Membership and Participation at a Sealed-Bid Auction"; "Chapter 9. Implementation of Collusion by Rings"; "9.1 Rings versus Cartels"; "9.2 Ring Secret Deviations"; "9.3 Ring Pricing Structures and Seller Resistance"; "9.4 Ring Allocation Structures"; "9.5 Ring Enforcement Structures"; "9.6 Ring Mechanisms for Standard Auction Types"; "9.7 Efficiency of Allocations"  
"9.8 Conclusion"

#### Sommario/riassunto

Explicit collusion is an agreement among competitors to suppress rivalry that relies on interfirm communication and/or transfers. Rivalry between competitors erodes profits; the suppression of rivalry through collusion is one avenue by which firms can enhance profits. Many cartels and bidding rings function for years in a stable and peaceful manner despite the illegality of their agreements and incentives for deviation by their members. In *The Economics of Collusion*, Robert Marshall and Leslie Marx offer an examination of collusive behavior: what it is, why it is profitable, how it is implemented, and how it might be detected. Marshall and Marx, who have studied collusion extensively for two decades, begin with three narratives: the organization and implementation of a cartel, the organization and implementation of a bidding ring, and a parent company's efforts to detect collusion by its divisions. These accounts--fictitious, but rooted in the inner workings and details from actual cases--offer a novel and engaging way for the reader to understand the basics of collusive behavior. The narratives are followed by detailed economic analyses of cartels, bidding rings, and detection. The narratives offer an engaging entree to the more rigorous economic discussion that follows. The book is accessible to any reader who understands basic economic reasoning. Mathematical material is flagged with asterisks.

2. Record Nr.	UNINA9910580143603321
Autore	Basco Sergi
Titolo	Pandemics, Economics and Inequality : Lessons from the Spanish Flu / / by Sergi Basco, Jordi Domènech, Joan R. Rosés
Pubbl/distr/stampa	Cham : , : Springer International Publishing : , : Imprint : Palgrave Macmillan, , 2022
ISBN	9783031056680 303105668X
Edizione	[1st ed. 2022.]
Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (133 pages)
Collana	Palgrave Studies in Economic History, , 2662-6500
Disciplina	614.51809041 330.9041
Soggetti	Economic history Macroeconomics Development economics Economic History Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics Development Economics
Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia
Nota di bibliografia	Includes bibliographical references (pages 105-118) and index.
Nota di contenuto	1 Introduction -- 2 An Overview of Pandemics -- 3 The Spanish Flu in the News -- 4 Unequal Mortality during the Spanish Flu -- 5 The Spanish Flu and the Labor Market -- 6 The Spanish Flu and the Housing Market -- 7 Taking Stock: The Aggregate Effects of the Spanish Flu.
Sommario/riassunto	This Pivot book provides a framework for understanding the economic and potentially unequal effects of pandemics, focusing closely on the Spanish Flu. It provides an in-depth analysis of the different effects of the Spanish Flu on the economy from unequal mortality to wages, housing and output. There is a general review of the literature but an important feature of this book is that it explains results using data from Spain, an ideal country to perform this exercise, as its mortality data is not affected by the First World War. Spain was also developed enough to have reliable data, but it was very heterogeneous across regions which will allow a comparison of more and less developed regions. No other book exists that offers a comprehensive and data-

driven view of the effects of the Spanish Flu, which is the closest pandemic example to Covid-19. With the outbreak of Covid-19 increasing the need to learn about the economic effects of pandemics, this book will be of interest to academics and students of economic history, macroeconomics (economic crises) and economic development, as well being accessible for the general reader. Sergi Basco is Associate Professor in the Department of Economics at the University of Barcelona, Spain. Jordi Domènec is Associate Professor in the Department of Social Sciences at University Carlos III of Madrid, Spain. Joan R. Rosés is Professor in the Department of Economic History at London School of Economics, UK.

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