

1. Record Nr.	UNISA996383794903316
Autore	Lydgate John <1370?-1451?>
Titolo	This lytell treatyse compendiously declareth the damage and destruction in realmes [[electronic resource]] : caused by the serpente of diuision
Pubbl/distr/stampa	[London], : Newly and of late imprinted by me Roberte Redman, dwellynge at London in Flete Strete at the sygne of the George, [ca. 1535]
Descrizione fisica	[44] p
Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia
Note generali	<p>Attributed to Lydgate by STC (2nd ed.).</p> <p>"Thus endeth this lytell treatyse entytuled the Damage and destruction in realmes"--Colophon.</p> <p>Publisher statement taken from colophon; date of imprint suggested by STC (2nd ed.).</p> <p>Signatures: A-Bâ, Câ¶.</p> <p>T.p. contains illustration.</p> <p>Reproduction of original in the Exeter College (University of Oxford) Library.</p>
Sommario/riassunto	eebo-0051

2. Record Nr.	UNINA9910574074903321
Titolo	Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2022 : 41st Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, Trondheim, Norway, May 30 – June 3, 2022, Proceedings, Part III // edited by Orr Dunkelman, Stefan Dziembowski
Pubbl/distr/stampa	Cham : , : Springer International Publishing : , : Imprint : Springer, , 2022
ISBN	3-031-07082-8
Edizione	[1st ed. 2022.]
Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (841 pages)
Collana	Lecture Notes in Computer Science, , 1611-3349 ; ; 13277
Disciplina	005.824 005.82
Soggetti	Cryptography Data encryption (Computer science) Application software Computer networks Data protection Cryptology Computer and Information Systems Applications Computer Communication Networks Security Services Data and Information Security
Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia
Note generali	Includes index.
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Sommario/riassunto

The 3-volume-set LNCS 13275, 13276 and 13277 constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 41st Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, Eurocrypt 2022, which was held in Trondheim, Norway, during 30 May – 3 June, 2022. The 85 full papers included in these proceedings were accepted from a total of 372 submissions. They were organized in topical sections as follows: Part I: Best Paper Award; Secure Multiparty Computation; Homomorphic Encryption; Obfuscation; Part II: Cryptographic Protocols; Cryptographic Primitives; Real-World Systems Part III: Symmetric-Key Cryptanalysis; Side Channel Attacks and Masking, Post-Quantum Cryptography; Information-Theoretic Security.
