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Sommario/riassunto

"Cyber security is a serious concern to our economic prosperity and national security. Despite an increased investment in cyber defense, cyber-attackers are becoming more creative and sophisticated. This exposes the need for a more rigorous approach to cyber security, including methods from artificial intelligence including computational game theory and machine learning. Recent advances in adversarial machine learning are promising to make artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms more robust to deception and intelligent manipulation. However, they are still vulnerable to adversarial inputs, data poisoning, model stealing and evasion attacks. The above challenges and the high risk and consequence of cyber-attacks drive the need to accelerate basic research on cyber security"-- Provided by publisher
