

1. Record Nr.	UNINA9910508448303321
Titolo	Decision and game theory for security : 12th international conference, GameSec 2021, virtual event, October 25-27, 2021 : proceedings // Branislav Bosansky [and three others] (editors)
Pubbl/distr/stampa	Cham, Switzerland : , : Springer, , [2021] ©2021
ISBN	3-030-90370-2
Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (385 pages)
Collana	Lecture Notes in Computer Science ; ; v.13061
Disciplina	005.8
Soggetti	Computer security Game theory
Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia
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