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Nota di contenuto	Intro Preface Organization Contents Stealth Low-Level Manipulation of Programmable Logic Controllers I/O by Pin Control Exploitation 1 Introduction 2 Background 2.1 Pin Control Subsystem 2.2 How PLCs Control the Pins 3 Pin Control Attack 3.1 Security Concerns Regarding Pin Control 3.2 Pin Control Attack Details 3.3 Threat Model 4 A Pin Control Attack in Practice 4.1 Environment Setup 4.2 Attack Implementation 5 Discussion

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الا ع fu s ir ir p tt tt ir ir	This book constitutes the post-conference proceedings of the 11th international Conference on Critical Information Infrastructures Security, CRITIS 2016, held in Paris, France, in October 2016. The 22 all papers and 8 short papers presented were carefully reviewed and elected from 58 submissions. They present the most recent innovations, trends, results, experiences and concerns in selected perspectives of critical information infrastructure protection covering the range from small-scale cyber-physical systems security via information infrastructures and their interaction with national and international infrastructures.