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3. SOME REMARKS ABOUT THE GENERAL MODEL REFERENCES; Chapter 5. Bounded Rationality and Strategic Complexity in Repeated Games; 1. INTRODUCTION; 2. DESCRIPTION OF STRATEGIC GAMES; 3. DESCRIPTION OF REPEATED GAMES; 4. AUTOMATA AND COMPLEXITY MEASURES IN REPEATED GAMES; 5. GAMES WITH RESTRICTED PLAYERS; 6. COMPLEXITY CHOICES OF UNRESTRICTED PLAYERS; 7. CONCLUDING REMARKS; ACKNOWLEDGMENTS; BIBLIOGRAPHY; The Shapley Value; ACKNOWLEDGMENTS; REFERENCES; Chapter 6. Advances in Value Theory; 1. FINITE GAMES WITH TRANSFERABLE UTILITY; 2. FINITE GAMES WITH NONTRANSFERABLE UTILITY 3. LARGE GAMES WITH TRANSFERABLE UTILITY 4. LARGE GAMES WITH NONTRANSFERABLE UTILITY; ACKNOWLEDGMENTS; REFERENCES; Chapter 7. Axiomatizations of the Core, the Nucleolus, and the Prekernel; 1. COALITIONAL GAMES WITH TRANSFERABLE UTILITY; 2. COALITIONAL GAMES WITHOUT SIDE PAYMENTS; REFERENCES; Chapter 8. Consistency; REFERENCES; Chapter 9. The Consistency Principle; 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION; 2. THE CONSISTENCY PRINCIPLE; 3. APPLICATIONS; 4. CONCLUDING COMMENTS; ACKNOWLEDGMENTS; REFERENCES; Chapter 10. Discrete Concepts in n-Person Game Theory: Nondegeneracy and Homogeneity; 1. INTRODUCTION 2. NOTATION 3. EXAMPLES; 4. NONDEGENERACY AND HOMOGENEITY; 6. THE WALRASIAN EQUILIBRIUM AND THE CORE IN A TRANSFERABLE UTILITY MARKET (TU MARKET); REFERENCES; Chapter 11. Two-Sided Matching Markets: An Overview of Some Theory and Empirical Evidence; 1. INTRODUCTION; 2. THE LABOR MARKET FOR AMERICAN MEDICAL INTERNS; 3. A MODEL OF THE HOSPITAL-INTERN MARKET; 4. STABILITY AND STRATEGY; 5. THE DETAILED STRUCTURE OF THE SET OF STABLE MATCHINGS; 6. DISCUSSION; ACKNOWLEDGMENTS; REFERENCES; Chapter 12. Strategic Market Game Models of Exchange Economies; 1. INTRODUCTION; 2. MARKETS WITH A SINGLE MONEY 3. MARKETS WITH MANY MONIES

Sommario/riassunto

Game Theory and Applications outlines game theory and proves its validity by examining it alongside the neoclassical paradigm. This book contends that the neoclassical theory is the exceptional case, and that game theory may indeed be the rule. The papers and abstracts collected here explore its recent development and suggest new research directions. Key Features* Explains many of the recent central developments in game theory* Highlights new research directions in economic theory which surpass the neoclassical paradigm* Includes game-theoretical analyses in economics, political science, and bi