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Nota di contenuto	Contents; Preface; List of Figures; List of Tables; List of Abbreviations; 1. Introduction: Political Partisanship and the Puzzle of Corporate Governance Change in Europe; 1.1 Why corporate governance matters?; 1.2 Recent developments in European corporate governance; 1.3 Corporate governance and partisanship; 1.4 Plan of the book; 1.5 Chapter Appendix; 2. A Theory of Partisanship and Corporate Governance Change; 2.1 Change in corporate governance outcomes - between blockholder and shareholder models; 2.2 The nature of economic rents; 2.3 Corporate governance and economic rents 2.4 The argument: interaction of partisanship and product market competition3. Alternative Explanations of Corporate Governance: A Critique of the Literature; 3.1 Economic approaches to corporate governance; 3.2 Legal approaches to corporate governance; 3.3 Political approaches to corporate governance; 3.4 Sociological approaches to corporate governance; 3.5 Corporate governance and nondomestic factors; 4. Measuring Change in Corporate Governance;

4.1 Measures of de facto corporate governance behavior; 4.2 Measures of corporate governance regulation
5. The Measurement of Product Market Competition
5.1 Real price levels; 5.2 Concentration indices; 5.3 Profit margins; 5.4 Openness to trade; 5.5 Survey measures of competition; 5.6 OECD indices of product market competition; 6. A Panel Data Analysis of Corporate Governance Change; 6.1 The variables; 6.2 Methodology; 6.3 Findings;
7. Robustness and Dynamic Modeling; 7.1 Tests of robustness; 7.2 Dynamic modeling of corporate governance; 8. Qualitative Analysis: Introduction to the Case Studies; 8.1 Rationale for the case studies; 8.2 Choice of country cases
9. The Case of Germany: From Blockholding to Hybrid Corporate Governance Regime
9.1 The corporate governance of Deutschland AG; 9.2 Economic rents and German corporate strategy; 9.3 The politics of corporate governance in Germany; 9.4 Explaining corporate governance change in Germany; 10. The Case of Italy: Everything Changes, Everything Stays the Same; 10.1 The nature of postwar corporate governance in Italy; 10.2 Reform of Italian corporate governance?; 10.3 EMU and the empowerment of the technocrats; 10.4 Corporate governance reform: partisan politics or elite project?
10.5 Conclusion: economic rents and Italian corporate governance
11. Conclusions; Bibliography; Index; A; B; C; D; E; F; G; H; I; J; K; L; M; N; O; P; Q; R; S; T; V; W

Sommario/riassunto

The corporate governance systems of continental Europe have traditionally been quite different to those of the liberal market economies (e.g. the US and the UK). Company ownership has been dominated by incumbent blockholders, with a relatively minor role for minority shareholders and institutional investors. Business strategy has focused on the achievement of social stability - taking into account the interests of a broad group stakeholders - rather than the maximisation of shareholder value. However, since the mid-1990s, European corporations have adopted many of the characteristics of the Ang
