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Autore	Finkel Meir <1968->
Titolo	On flexibility [[electronic resource]] : recovery from technological and doctrinal surprise on the battlefield / / Meir Finkel ; translated by Moshe Tlamim
Pubbl/distr/stampa	Stanford, Calif., : Stanford Security Studies, 2011
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Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (337 p.)
Altri autori (Persone)	TlamimMoshe
Disciplina	355.02
Soggetti	Military readiness Military doctrine Military art and science Surprise (Military science) Military history, Modern - 20th century Technology - Military aspects Electronic books.
Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
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Note generali	Description based upon print version of record.
Nota di bibliografia	Includes bibliographical references and index.
Nota di contenuto	Prediction and intelligence : the dominant approach in force planning and its failure to answer the challenge of technological and doctrinal surprise -- Conceptual and doctrinal flexibility -- Organizational and technological flexibility -- Cognitive and command and control (C2) flexibility -- The mechanism for lesson learning and rapid dissemination -- The German recovery from the surprise of British chaff -- The German recovery from the Soviet T-34 tank surprise -- The Israeli recovery from the Egyptian Sagger missile surprise -- The Israeli air force recovery from the Arab anti-aircraft missile surprise -- The slow British recovery from the German armor and anti-tank tactics -- The slow Soviet recovery from the surprise of low-intensity conflict in Afghanistan -- The French failure to recover from the surprise of the German blitzkrieg.
Sommario/riassunto	This book addresses one of the basic questions in military studies: How can armies cope effectively with technological and doctrinal surprises-ones that leave them vulnerable to new weapons systems and/or

combat doctrines? Author Meir Finkel contends that the current paradigm-with its over-dependence on intelligence and an all-out effort to predict the nature of the future battlefield and the enemy's capabilities-generally doesn't work. Based on historical case analysis of successful ""under-fire"" recovery and failure to recover, he identifies the variables that have dete
