1. Record Nr. UNINA9910464236403321 Autore Batini Nicoletta Titolo Monetary and fiscal rules in an emerging small open economy [[electronic resource] /] / prepared by Nicoletta Batini, Paul Levine, and Joseph Pearlman [Washington D.C.],: International Monetary Fund, 2009 Pubbl/distr/stampa **ISBN** 1-4623-0936-4 1-4527-1173-9 1-4518-7169-4 1-282-84244-7 9786612842443 Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (80 p.) Collana IMF working paper; ; WP/09/22 Altri autori (Persone) LevinePaul PearlmanJoseph Soggetti Monetary policy - Developing countries Fiscal policy - Developing countries Electronic books. Lingua di pubblicazione Inglese **Formato** Materiale a stampa Livello bibliografico Monografia Description based upon print version of record. Note generali Nota di bibliografia Includes bibliographical references. Contents; I. Introduction; II. The Model; A. Households; B. Firms; C. The Nota di contenuto Government Budget Constraint and Foreign Asset Accumulation; D. The Equilibrium; E. Specialization of the Household's Utility Function; F. State Space Representation; G. The Small Open Economy; H. Calibration; III. Monetary Policy Interest Rate Rules; IV. Fiscal Rules; A. A. Conventional Fiscal Rule; B. The Structural Fiscal Surplus Rule; V. Imposing the Nominal Interest Rate Zero Lower Bound; VI. Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy with Financial Frictions; A. Imposing the ZLB; Figures; 1. Imposition of ZLB: Model I 2. Imposition of ZLB: Model IIIB. Welfare Decomposition; C. Impulse Responses: 3. Impulse Responses to a-1 Percent Technology Shock. Models I, II, and III; VII. The Performance of Optimized Simple Rules; 4. Imposition of ZLB: Flex(D)+Conventional Fiscal Rule, Model I; 5. Imposition of ZLB: Flex(D)+Conventional Fiscal Rule: Model III; VIII.

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## Sommario/riassunto

We develop a optimal rules-based interpretation of the 'three pillars macroeconomic policy framework': a combination of a freely floating exchange rate, an explicit target for inflation, and a mechanism than ensures a stable government debt-GDP ratio around a specified long run. We show how such monetary-fiscal rules need to be adjusted to accommodate specific features of emerging market economies. The model takes the form of two-blocs, a DSGE emerging small open economy interacting with the rest of the world and features, in particular, financial frictions It is calibrated using Chile and US