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Sommario/riassunto	The paper analyzes Chile's structural balance fiscal rule in the face of copper price shocks originating in foreign copper demand. It uses a

version of the IMF's Global Integrated Monetary and Fiscal Model (GIMF) that includes a copper sector. Two results are obtained. First, Chile's current fiscal rule performs well if the policymaker puts a small weight on output volatility (relative to inflation volatility) in his/her objective function. A more aggressive countercyclical fiscal rule can attain lower output volatility, but there is a trade-off with (somewhat) higher inflation volatility and