

1. Record Nr.	UNINA9910463558803321
Titolo	Partitioning the soul : debates from Plato to Leibniz // edited by Klaus Corcilus, Dominik Perler
Pubbl/distr/stampa	Berlin ; ; Boston : , : De Gruyter, , [2014] ©2014
ISBN	3-11-037698-9 3-11-031188-7
Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (312 p.)
Collana	Topoi, , 2191-5806 ; ; volume 22
Disciplina	128.1
Soggetti	Soul Electronic books.
Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia
Note generali	Description based upon print version of record.
Nota di bibliografia	Includes bibliographical references and indexes.
Nota di contenuto	Front matter -- Contents -- Introduction / Corcilus, Klaus / Perler, Dominik -- Plato's Divided Soul / Shields, Christopher -- Parts in Aristotle's Definition of Soul: De Anima Books I and II / Johansen, Thomas K. -- Walking and Talking: Reflections on Divisions of the Soul in Stoicism / Inwood, Brad -- Partitioning the Soul: Galen on the Anatomy of the Psychic Functions and Mental Illness / Hankinson, Robert J. -- Parts of the Soul in Plotinus / Karfik, Filip -- Iamblichus, Proclus and Philoponus on Parts, Capacities and ousiai of the Soul and the Notion of Life / Helmig, Christoph -- Ockham on Emotions in the Divided Soul / Perler, Dominik -- Virtual Presence: Psychic Mereology in Francisco Suárez / Shields, Christopher -- The Faces of Simplicity in Descartes's Soul / Rozemond, Marleen -- Spinoza on the Unity of Will and Intellect / Schmid, Stephan -- The Great Chain of Souls: Leibniz on Soul Unitarism and Soul Kinds / Barth, Christian -- List of Contributors -- Index of Names
Sommario/riassunto	Does the soul have parts? What kind of parts? And how do all the parts make together a whole? Many ancient, medieval and early modern philosophers discussed these questions, thus providing a mereological analysis of the soul. Their starting point was a simple observation: we tend to describe the soul of human beings by referring to different

types of activities (perceiving, imagining, thinking, etc.). Each type of activity seems to be produced by a special part of the soul. But how can a simple, undivided soul have parts? Classical thinkers gave radically different answers to this question. While some claimed that there are indeed parts, thus assigning an internal complexity to the soul, others emphasized that there can only be a plurality of functions that should not be conflated with a plurality of parts. The eleven chapters reconstruct and critically examine these answers. They make clear that the metaphysical structure of the soul was a crucial issue for ancient, medieval and early modern philosophers.
