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Sommario/riassunto

Hutto and Myin promote the cause of a radically enactive, embodied approach to cognition which holds that some kinds of minds - basic minds - are neither best explained by processes involving the manipulation of contents nor inherently contentful. It opposes the widely endorsed thesis that cognition always and everywhere involves content. The authors defend the counter-thesis that there can be intentionality and phenomenal experience without content, and demonstrate the advantages of their approach for thinking about scaffolded minds and consciousness.
