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Autonomy; From Presumed Consent to Organ Taking; The Standard
Pro-Taking Argument; Two Unjustified Assumptions-Moving Towards
Markets
The Ownership of Organs

Sommario/riassunto

Death, Posthumous Harm, and Bioethics offers a highly distinctive and original approach to the metaphysics of death and applies this approach to contemporary debates in bioethics that address end-of-life and post-mortem issues. Taylor defends the controversial Epicurean view that death is not a harm to the person who dies and the neo-Epicurean thesis that persons cannot be affected by events that occur after their deaths, and hence that posthumous harms (and benefits) are impossible. He then extends this argument by asserting that the dead cannot be wronged, finally presenting a de
