Record Nr. UNINA9910459820703321 The concept of love in 17th and 18th century philosophy [[electronic **Titolo** resource] /] / Gabor Boros, Herman De Dijn, Martin Moors (eds.) Pubbl/distr/stampa [Leuven, Belgium], : Leuven University Press [Budapest, Hungary], : Eotvos Univ. Press, c2007 **ISBN** 94-6166-018-9 Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (270 p.) Altri autori (Persone) BorosGabor DijnHerman de <1943-> MoorsM <1947-> (Martin) Disciplina 128 Soggetti Love - Philosophy Emotions (Philosophy) Philosophy, Modern - 17th century Philosophy, Modern - 18th century Electronic books. Lingua di pubblicazione Inglese **Formato** Materiale a stampa Livello bibliografico Monografia Description based upon print version of record. Note generali

Nota di bibliografia Includes bibliographical references.

Nota di contenuto

The Concept of Love in 17th and 18thCentury Philosophy; Table of Contents; Introduction; Abbreviations; Affiliations of the Contributors; Cartesian Subjectivity and Love; 1. The problem of the emotion; 2. Love and representation; 3. The problem of the interest; The Role of Amicitia in Political Life; L'apparition de l'amour de soi dans l'Ethique; Nature et fondement de l'amour-propreou de l'amour de soi; L'absence d'amour-propre dans le Court Traiteet le Traite de la reforme de l'entendement; L'emergence de l'amour-propre et de l'amourde soi dans l'Ethique;

Spinoza uber Liebe und Erkenntnis

Leibniz on Love1.1. Passions, Passivity; 1.2. The Conatus; 1.3. Passions and Actions Reconsidered; 2. Leibnizean Love; 2.1. The Metaphysical Concept of Love; 3. Love in Natural Law; Abbreviations; Malebranche on Natural and Free Loves; 1. Descartes on Passionate and Rational Love; 1.1. Passionate love in the Passions; 1.2. Rational love in the letter to Chanut; 2. Malebranche on Love and the Will; 2.1. Descartes and Augustine; 2.2. Three characteristics of the will; 2.2.1. Will as motion;

- 2.2.2. Will as directed to the good; 2.2.3. Will as the desire for happiness
- 3. Malebranche on Natural Love4. Malebranche on Free Love; 4.1. The turning of natural love; 4.2. The rest of consent; 4.3. The determination of free love; The Problem of Conscience and Order in the Amour-pur Debate; 1.; 2.; 3.; Love of God and Love of Creatures: The Masham-Astell Exchange; 1.; 2.; 3.; 4.; The Theory and Regulation of Love in 17th Century Philosophy; 1.; 2.; 3.; 4.; 5.; 6.; 7.; Frances Hutcheson: From moral sense to spectatorial rights; 1. Background; 2. Hutcheson's moral theory; 3. Hutcheson on rights; 4. Hutcheson on Animal Rights; 5. Conclusion

Philosophy as medicina mentis? Hume and Spinoza on Emotions and Wisdom1. Spinoza and the Search for Wisdom; 2. Conatus, Emotions, Reason; 3. From knowledge to salvation; 4. Hume on reason and 'the medecine of the mind'; 5. From Passions to Reason; 6. Humean Wisdom and Diffidence; The Depth of the Heart - "even if a bit tumultuous". On Compassion and Erotic Love in Diderot's Ethics; 1.; 2.; 3.; 4.; 5.; 6.; 7.; 8.; 9.; 10.; 11.; 12.; Motivational Internalism: A Kantian Perspective on Moral Motives and Reasons; Introduction; 1. Reason or feeling? The British Debate concerningmoral motives

- 2. Kant's conception of moral motivation3. The formal, emotive and autonomous dimensionsof moral motivation; Conclusion; Kant on: "Love God above all, and your neighbour as yourself"; 1. Love As The Content Of Kant's Ethics Of Virtue; 2. How must the Duty of Love be seen as a DivineCommand?; A. The Duty Of Religion As A Duty Of A Human BeingTo Himself; 1. The recognition of all our duties as divine commands; 2. God, a fiction strengthening the moral feeling of respect; B. The Command 'To Love God' and The Dispositionof Gladness; 1. Gladness and holiness
- 2. Inner religion as rational self-love

Sommario/riassunto

""Love is joy with the accompanying idea of an external cause."" Spinoza's definition of love (Ethics Book 3, Prop. LIX) manifests a major paradigm shift achieved by seventeenth century Europe in which the emotions, formerly seen as normative ""forces of nature,"" were embraced by the new science of the mind. We are determined to volition by causes. This shift has often been seen as a transition from a philosophy laden with implicit values and assumptions to a more scientific and value-free way of understanding human action. But is this rational approach really value-free? Today we incline to