

1. Record Nr.	UNINA9910458755403321
Titolo	Aspects of knowing [[electronic resource]] : epistemological essays // edited by Stephen Hetherington
Pubbl/distr/stampa	Oxford, UK ; ; Boston, : Elsevier, 2006
ISBN	1-280-64111-8 9786610641116 0-08-046269-3
Edizione	[1st ed.]
Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (257 p.)
Collana	Perspectives on cognitive science series
Altri autori (Persone)	HetheringtonStephen Cade
Disciplina	121
Soggetti	Knowledge, Theory of Philosophy Electronic books.
Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia
Note generali	"This book originated in a conference held at the University of New South Wales in December 2004"--Acknowledgements.
Nota di bibliografia	Includes bibliographical references and indexes.
Nota di contenuto	Front cover; Title page; Copyright page; Table of contents; Acknowledgements; Contributors; 1 Introduction: The Art of Precise Epistemology; Questions; Quine's Naturalization of Epistemology; Quine's Farewell to the Concept of Knowledge; Drowning in Details; Leaving Out Lines; Discerning Lines; This Book's Essays; Australian Epistemology; References; Part A Epistemology as Scientific?; 2 A Problem About Epistemic Dependence; Foundationalism, Coherence, and Epistemic Dependence; Why an Account of Dependence is Needed; With What Kind of Justification Are We Concerned? An Account in Terms of Necessary ConditionsAn Account in Terms of Support Relations; Personal Justification and the Basing Relation Reconsidered; Acknowledgements; References; 3 Accounting for Commitments: A priori Knowledge, Ontology, and Logical Entailments; A Puzzle and Jackson's Solution; A More General Puzzle for the Necessitation Account; Is Jackson Really a Necessitarian?; Conclusion; References; 4 Epistemic Bootstrapping; Plantinga on Christianity; With One Bound the Brain Leapt Out of its Vat; An Informal Analysis; The Bayesian Analysis; Unwarranted Even if True

Back to the Example of ChristianityThe Refutation of Scepticism; Replies to Two Objections; Conclusion; References; 5 More Praise for Moore's Proof; Moore's Argument and Meta-Argument; What's Wrong with Moore's Proof ?; The Dogmatist Defense; The Dialectical Critique; Might Moore's Argument Rationally Persuade?; Moore's Proof Versus Philosophical Proofs; Why Does Moore's Argument Seem So Bad?; Epistemological Lessons from Moore; Moore Meets Bayes; Conclusion; References; 6 Lotteries and the Close Shave Principle; The Lottery Problem; The Lottery Generalized
The Far-Fetched and the Merely ImprobableInductive Knowledge; Conclusion; References; 7 Skepticism, Self-Knowledge, and Responsibility; The Idea of a Once-and-for-All (Dis)Solution; The Interminability of Skepticism; Hume's New Science of the Mind; Two Perspectives on one's Own Beliefs; The Two Stances and the Avoidance of Responsibility; Nagel on Skepticism; Naturalism and Skepticism; References; 8 A Reasonable Contextualism (or, Austin Reprised); Austin's Modest Proposal; Scepticism and Nonsense; References; 9 Questioning Contextualism; Basic Indexicals in Questions
Other Type B Terms in QuestionsQuestions about Knowledge; Objections and Replies; References; Part B Understanding Knowledge?; 10 Truthmaking and the Gettier Problem; The Classic Gettier Cases; States of Affairs and Truthmaking; True Sentences; Compass and Ruler in Truthmaking; Missed Opportunities; References; 11 Is Knowing Having the Right to be Sure?; References; 12 Knowledge by Intention? On the Possibility of Agent's Knowledge; Introduction; A Causal Approach; The Reasons-Based Model; Fallibilism and the Gap; Conclusion; References; 13 Gettier's Theorem; The Manifest Image; Taking Heart
Three Axioms

Sommario/riassunto

AcknowledgementsContributors1. Introduction: The art of precise epistemology Stephen HetheringtonPart A. Epistemology as scientific? 2. A problem about epistemic dependenceTim Oakley3. Accounting for commitments: A priori knowledge, ontology, and logical entailmentsMichaelis Michael4. Epistemic bootstrappingPeter Forrest5. More praise for Moore's proofRoger White6. Lotteries and the Close Shave principleJohn Collins7. Skepticism, self-knowledge, and responsibilityDavid Macarthur8. A reasonable contextualism (or, Austin
