Record Nr. UNINA9910458200203321 Delusion and self-deception: affective and motivational influences on **Titolo** belief formation / / edited by Tim Bayne and Jordi Fernandez Pubbl/distr/stampa New York:,: Psychology Press,, 2009 **ISBN** 1-136-87487-9 1-283-04305-X 9786613043054 0-203-83804-1 Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (312 p.) Collana Macquarie monographs in cognitive science Altri autori (Persone) **BayneTim** FernandezJordi Disciplina 153 Soggetti Belief and doubt **Delusions** Self-deception Electronic books. Lingua di pubblicazione Inglese **Formato** Materiale a stampa Livello bibliografico Monografia Note generali Description based upon print version of record. Nota di bibliografia Includes bibliographical references and indexes. Nota di contenuto Book Cover; Title; Copyright; Contents; Acknowledgments; Editors; Contributors: 1 Delusion and Self-Deception Mapping the Terrain: 2 Passion, Reason, and Necessity A Quantity-of-Processing View of Motivated Reasoning; 3 Self-Deception and Delusions; 4 Delusion and Motivationally Biased Belief Self-Deception in the Two-Factor Framework; 5 Emotion, Cognition, and Belief Findings From Cognitive Neuroscience; 6 Perception, Emotions, and Delusions The Case of the Capgras Delusion: 7 From Phenomenology to Cognitive Architecture and Back; 8 Monothematic Delusions and Existential Feelings 9 "Sleights of Mind" Delusions and Self-Deception10 Cognitive and Motivational Factors in Anosognosia; 11 Self-Deception Without Thought Experiments; 12 Hysterical Conversion A Mirror Image of Anosognosia?; 13 Imagination, Delusion, and Self-Deception; Author Index; Subject Index Sommario/riassunto This collection of essays focuses on the interface between delusions and self-deception. As pathologies of belief, delusions and selfdeception raise many of the same challenges for those seeking to understand them. Are delusions and self-deception entirely distinct phenomena, or might some forms of self-deception also qualify as delusional? To what extent might models of self-deception and delusion share common factors? In what ways do affect and motivation enter into normal belief-formation, and how might they be implicated in self-deception and delusion? The essays in this volume tackle