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Edizione	[Second edition.]
Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (xii, 591 pages) : digital, PDF file(s)
Disciplina	302/.13
Soggetti	Social choice - Mathematical models
Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
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Nota di bibliografia	Includes bibliographical references and index.
Nota di contenuto	Cover; Half-title; Title; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Preface to the Second Edition; 1 Equilibrium, Efficiency, and Asymmetric Information; 2 Basic Models and Tools; 3 Hidden Action; 4 Corporate Governance; 5 Hidden Characteristics; 6 Auctions; 7 Voting and Preference Revelation; 8 Public Goods and Preference Revelation; 9 Matching; 10 General Competitive Equilibrium; References; Author Index; Subject Index
Sommario/riassunto	This book, first published in 2006, examines the incentives at work in a wide range of institutions to see how and how well coordination is achieved by informing and motivating individual decision makers. The book examines the performance of agents hired to carry out specific tasks, from taxi drivers to CEOs. It investigates the performance of institutions, from voting schemes to kidney transplants, to see if they enhance general well being. The book examines a broad range of market transactions, from auctions to labor markets, to the entire economy. The analysis is conducted using specific worked examples, lucid general theory, and illustrations drawn from news stories. Of the seventy different topics and sections, only twelve require a knowledge of calculus. The second edition offers new chapters on auctions,

matching and assignment problems, and corporate governance. Boxed examples are used to highlight points of theory and are separated from the main text.
