1. Record Nr. UNINA9910457856203321 Autore Moyar Mark <1971-> Titolo Triumph forsaken: the Vietnam war, 1954-1965 / / Mark Moyar [[electronic resource]] Cambridge:,: Cambridge University Press,, 2006 Pubbl/distr/stampa 1-107-17123-7 **ISBN** 0-521-75763-0 0-511-51164-7 0-511-24722-2 0-511-32288-7 0-511-24583-1 Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (xxvi, 512 pages) : digital, PDF file(s) Disciplina 959.704/3 Soggetti Vietnam War, 1961-1975 Vietnam History 1945-1975 Lingua di pubblicazione Inglese **Formato** Materiale a stampa Livello bibliografico Monografia Note generali Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015). Nota di bibliografia Includes bibliographical references (p. 419-502) and index. Nota di contenuto Preface-- 1. Heritage-- 2. Two Vietnams, July 1954-December 1955--3. Peaceful coexistence, 1956 1959-- 4. Insurgency, 1960-- 5. Commitment, 1961-- 6. Rejuvenation, January-June 1962-- 7. Attack, July-December 1962-- 8. The battle of Ap Bac, January 1963-- 9. Diem on trial, February-July 1963-- 10. Betrayal, August 1963-- 11. Selfdestruction, September-November 2, 1963-- 12. The return of the twelve warlords, November 3-December 1963-- 13. Self-imposed restrictions, January-July 1964-- 14. Signals, August-October 1964--15. Invasion, November-December 1964-- 16. The price for victory, January-May 1965-- 17. Decision, June-July 1965. Drawing on a wealth of new evidence from all sides. Triumph Forsaken. Sommario/riassunto first published in 2007, overturns most of the historical orthodoxy on the Vietnam War. Through the analysis of international perceptions and power, it shows that South Vietnam was a vital interest of the United

States. The book provides many insights into the overthrow of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963 and demonstrates that the coup negated the South Vietnamese government's tremendous, and

hitherto unappreciated, military and political gains between 1954 and 1963. After Diem's assassination, President Lyndon Johnson had at his disposal several aggressive policy options that could have enabled South Vietnam to continue the war without a massive US troop infusion, but he ruled out these options because of faulty assumptions and inadequate intelligence, making such an infusion the only means of saving the country.