1. Record Nr. UNINA9910457701703321

Autore
Titolo

|  | coalitions in Co |
| :--- | :---: |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Cambridge : , : |
| ISBN | $1-107-16155-X$ |
|  | $1-280-54055-9$ |
|  | $0-511-21549-5$ |
|  | $0-511-21728-5$ |
|  | $0-511-21191-0$ |
|  | $0-511-31587-2$ |
|  | $0-511-61714-3$ |

Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (xii, 267 pages) : digital, PDF file(s)

| Disciplina | $328.73 / 0775$ |
| :--- | :--- |
| Soggetti | Coalitions |
|  | United States Politics and government |

Lingua di pubblicazione
Formato
Livello bibliografico
Note generali
Nota di bibliografia
Nota di contenuto
Pork barrel politics and general interest legislation -- Who calls the shots? The allocation of pork barrel projects -- Highway demonstration projects and voting on the federal highway program -- Presidential bargaining with congress: the NAFTA bazaar -- Pork barreling in the Senate: do both parties do it?
Sommario/riassunto Pork barrel projects would surely rank near the top of most observers' lists of Congress's most widely despised products. Yet, political leaders in Congress and the President often trade pork for votes to pass legislation that serves broad national purposes, giving members of Congress pork barrel projects in return for their votes on general interest legislation. It is a practice that succeeds at a cost, but it is a cost that many political leaders are willing to pay in order to enact the broader public policies that they favor. There is an irony in this: pork barrel benefits, the most reviled of Congress's legislative products, are used by policy coalition leaders to produce the type of policy that is
most admired - general interest legislation. This book makes the case that buying votes with pork is one way in which Congress solves its well-known collective action problem.

