Record Nr. UNINA9910457072203321 Autore Serena Chad C **Titolo** A revolution in military adaptation [[electronic resource]]: the US Army in the Iraq War / / Chad C. Serena Washington, D.C., : Georgetown University Press, 2011 Pubbl/distr/stampa **ISBN** 1-58901-800-1 Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (453 p.) Disciplina 956.7044/340973 Soggetti Strategic culture - United States Organizational change Organizational effectiveness Electronic books. Lingua di pubblicazione Inglese **Formato** Materiale a stampa Monografia Livello bibliografico Note generali Description based upon print version of record. Includes bibliographical references and index. Nota di bibliografia Nota di contenuto Decisions in the post-Cold War period -- The transformation of the U. S. Army -- The invasion of Iraq and compelled adaptation -- U.S. Army adaptation organizational inputs -- U.S. Army adaptation organizational outputs and learning -- The U.S. Army and the post-9/11 international security environment in perspective. Sommario/riassunto During the early years of the Iraq War, the US Army was unable to translate initial combat success into strategic and political victory. Iraq plunged into a complex insurgency, and defeating this insurgency required beating highly adaptive foes. A competition between the hierarchical and vertically integrated army and networked and horizontally integrated insurgents ensued. The latter could quickly adapt and conduct networked operations in a decentralized fashion:

the former was predisposed to fighting via prescriptive plans under a centralized command and control. To achieve success, the US A