Record Nr. UNINA9910457007203321 Autore Marmor Andrei Titolo Social conventions [[electronic resource]]: from language to law // Andrei Marmor Pubbl/distr/stampa Princeton, N.J., : Princeton University Press, c2009 **ISBN** 0-691-16223-9 1-282-45798-5 9786612457982 Edizione [Course Book] Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (201 p.) Princeton monographs in philosophy Collana Disciplina 323.01/4 Soggetti Convention (Philosophy) Social sciences - Philosophy Language and languages - Philosophy Electronic books. Lingua di pubblicazione Inglese **Formato** Materiale a stampa Livello bibliografico Monografia Description based upon print version of record. Note generali Nota di bibliografia Includes bibliographical references and index. Nota di contenuto Frontmatter -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Preface -- Chapter One: A First Look at the Nature of Conventions -- Chapter Two: Constitutive Conventions -- Chapter Three: Deep Conventions --Chapter Four: Conventions of Language: Semantics -- Chapter Five: Conventions of Language: Pragmatics -- Chapter Six: The Morality of Conventions -- Chapter Seven: The Conventional Foundations of Law -- Bibliography -- Index Sommario/riassunto Social conventions are those arbitrary rules and norms governing the countless behaviors all of us engage in every day without necessarily thinking about them, from shaking hands when greeting someone to driving on the right side of the road. In this book, Andrei Marmor offers a pathbreaking and comprehensive philosophical analysis of conventions and the roles they play in social life and practical reason, and in doing so challenges the dominant view of social conventions first laid out by David Lewis. Marmor begins by giving a general account of the nature of conventions, explaining the differences

> between coordinative and constitutive conventions and between deep and surface conventions. He then applies this analysis to explain how

conventions work in language, morality, and law. Marmor clearly demonstrates that many important semantic and pragmatic aspects of language assumed by many theorists to be conventional are in fact not, and that the role of conventions in the moral domain is surprisingly complex, playing mostly an auxiliary and supportive role. Importantly, he casts new light on the conventional foundations of law, arguing that the distinction between deep and surface conventions can be used to answer the prevalent objections to legal conventionalism. Social Conventions is a much-needed reappraisal of the nature of the rules that regulate virtually every aspect of human conduct.