

1. Record Nr.	UNINA9910455073603321
Autore	Reilly Ben
Titolo	Democracy in divided societies : electoral engineering for conflict management // Benjamin Reilly [[electronic resource]]
Pubbl/distr/stampa	Cambridge : , : Cambridge University Press, , 2001
ISBN	1-107-12218-X 0-511-04726-6 0-511-17435-7 1-280-43302-7 0-511-15416-X 0-521-79323-8 0-511-32828-1 0-511-49110-7
Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (xiii, 217 pages) : digital, PDF file(s)
Collana	Theories of institutional design
Disciplina	324.6/3
Soggetti	Elections Conflict management Democracy
Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia
Note generali	Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
Nota di bibliografia	Includes bibliographical references (p. 194-214) and index.
Nota di contenuto	Introduction: democracy in divided societies -- The historical development of preferential voting -- Centripetal incentives and political engineering in Australia -- The rise and fall of centripetalism in Papua New Guinea -- Electoral engineering and conflict management in divided societies 1: Fiji and Sri Lanka compared -- Electoral engineering and conflict management in divided societies 2: Northern Ireland, Estonia and beyond -- Technical variations and the theory of preference voting -- Conclusion: assessing the evidence.
Sommario/riassunto	Democracy is inherently difficult in societies divided along deep ethnic cleavages. Elections in such societies will often encourage 'centrifugal' politics which reward extremist ethnic appeals, zero-sum political behaviour and ethnic conflict, and which consequently often lead to the breakdown of democracy. Reilly examines the potential of 'electoral

engineering' as a mechanism of conflict management in divided societies. He focuses on the little-known experience of a number of divided societies which have used preferential, vote-pooling electoral systems - such as Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka, Northern Ireland and Fiji. Examination of these cases shows that electoral systems which encourage bargaining between rival political actors, which promote the development of broad-based, aggregative political parties and which present campaigning politicians with incentives to attract votes from a range of ethnic groups can, under certain conditions, encourage the development of moderate, accommodatory political competition in divided societies.

---