1. Record Nr. UNINA9910454982603321

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Titolo	The Bounds of Reason [[electronic resource]] : Game Theory and the Unification of the Behavioral Sciences
Pubbl/distr/stampa	Princeton, : Princeton University Press, 2009
ISBN	1-282-25913-X 9786612259135 1-4008-3036-2
Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (305 p.)
Disciplina	519.3
Soggetti	Game theory Human behavior Practical reason Psychology Social sciences --Methodology Game theory - Methodology Social sciences Business & Economics Economic Theory Mathematics Physical Sciences & Mathematics Algebra Electronic books.
Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia
Note generali	Description based upon print version of record.
Nota di contenuto	Cover; Title; Copyright; Contents; Preface; 1 Decision Theory and Human Behavior; 1.1 Beliefs, Preferences, and Constraints; 1.2 The Meaning of Rational Action; 1.3 Why Are Preferences Consistent?; 1.4 Time Inconsistency; 1.5 Bayesian Rationality and Subjective Priors; 1.6 The Biological Basis for Expected Utility; 1.7 The Allais and Ellsberg Paradoxes; 1.8 Risk and the Shape of the Utility Function; 1.9 Prospect Theory; 1.10 Heuristics and Biases in Decision Making; 2 Game Theory: Basic Concepts; 2.1 The Extensive Form; 2.2 The Normal Form; 2.3

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Sommario/riassunto

Game theory is central to understanding human behavior and relevant to all of the behavioral sciences--from biology and economics, to anthropology and political science. However, as The Bounds of Reason demonstrates, game theory alone cannot fully explain human behavior and should instead complement other key concepts championed by the behavioral disciplines. Herbert Gintis shows that just as game theory without broader social theory is merely technical bravado, so social theory without game theory is a handicapped enterprise. Gintis illustrates, for instance, that game theor