

1. Record Nr.	UNINA9910454534903321
Autore	Pepinsky Thomas B. <1979->
Titolo	Economic crises and the breakdown of authoritarian regimes : Indonesia and Malaysia in comparative perspective // Thomas B. Pepinsky [[electronic resource]]
Pubbl/distr/stampa	Cambridge : , : Cambridge University Press, , 2009
ISBN	1-107-19454-7 0-511-69919-0 0-521-74438-5 0-511-65161-9 0-511-59378-3 0-511-59285-X 0-511-59571-9
Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (xviii, 326 pages) : digital, PDF file(s)
Disciplina	959.505/4
Soggetti	Authoritarianism - Indonesia Authoritarianism - Malaysia Indonesia Politics and government 20th century Indonesia Economic policy Indonesia Economic conditions 20th century Malaysia Politics and government 20th century Malaysia Economic policy Malaysia Economic conditions 20th century
Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia
Note generali	Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
Nota di bibliografia	Includes bibliographical references and index.
Nota di contenuto	Crises, adjustment, and transitions -- Coalitional sources of adjustment and regime survival -- Authoritarian support coalitions : comparing Indonesia and Malaysia -- Adjustment policy in Indonesia, June 1997-May 1998 -- Adjustment policy in Malaysia, June 1997-December 1999 -- Authoritarian breakdown in Indonesia -- Authoritarian stability in Malaysia -- Cross-national perspectives -- Conclusions.

Sommario/riassunto

Why do some authoritarian regimes topple during financial crises, while others steer through financial crises relatively unscathed? In this book, Thomas B. Pepinsky uses the experiences of Indonesia and Malaysia and the analytical tools of open economy macroeconomics to answer this question. Focusing on the economic interests of authoritarian regimes' supporters, Pepinsky shows that differences in cross-border asset specificity produce dramatically different outcomes in regimes facing financial crises. When asset specificity divides supporters, as in Indonesia, they desire mutually incompatible adjustment policies, yielding incoherent adjustment policy followed by regime collapse. When coalitions are not divided by asset specificity, as in Malaysia, regimes adopt radical adjustment measures that enable them to survive financial crises. Combining rich qualitative evidence from Southeast Asia with cross-national time-series data and comparative case studies of Latin American autocracies, Pepinsky reveals the power of coalitions and capital mobility to explain how financial crises produce regime change.
