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Sommario/riassunto

The Madisonian approach to institutional design, as set forth in The Federalist Papers, is examined from the point of view of leading theorists of the "public choice" school who see themselves as the political heirs of that earlier legacy. Bernard Grofman taught a course on representation in which the readings included both the Federalist Papers and Buchanan and Tullock's Calculus of Consent. In teaching that course (and, as he writes, forcing himself to reread the Federalist carefully for the first time since his own graduate student days), his admiration for its authors, already high, grew
