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	: Anglo-American policy, regional nationalism and the future of Jordan, November 1958-March 1959.
Sommario/riassunto	Within two years of their abortive invasion of the Suez Canal zone in 1956, British troops once again intervened in a major Middle Eastern country. The Jordan intervention of July 1958 took place despite the steady decline of the British position in the country over the previous three years. This book examines why the government led by Harold Macmillan remained ready to use military force to prop up the regime of King Hussein even though the United States had emerged as the main Western power in the Middle East after 1956. Incorporating a variety of archival material, Blackwell provides new