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Autore	Colombetti Giovanna
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Nota di bibliografia	Includes bibliographical references and index.
Nota di contenuto	2.6 Alternatives to BET and Their Problems 2.7 Conclusion; 3 Emotional Episodes as Dynamical Patterns; 3.1 Introduction; 3.2 Fundamental Concepts of Dynamical Systems Theory (DST); 3.3 Dynamical Affective Science; 3.4 Implications for the Debate on the Nature of the Emotions; 3.5 Discreteness and Boundaries; 3.6 Moods; 3.7 Conclusion; 4 Reappraising Appraisal; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 Beginnings; 4.3 Downplaying the Body in the 1960's and 1970's; 4.4 Appraisal Theory Today: The Body as a Mere Interactant; 4.5 Eroding the Neural Boundaries between Cognition and Emotion; 4.6 Enacting Appraisal 4.7 Phenomenological Connections 4.8 A (Brief) Comparison with Prinz's "Embodied Appraisal"; 4.9 Conclusion; 5 How the Body Feels in Emotion Experience; 5.1 Introduction; 5.2 A Taxonomy of Bodily Feeling; 5.3 Conspicuous Bodily Feelings in Emotion Experience; 5.4 The "Obscurely Felt" Body; 5.5 Feeling Absorbed; 5.6 Conclusion; 6 Ideas for an Affective "Neuro-physio-phenomenology"; 6.1 Introduction; 6.2 Neurophenomenology in Theory and Practice; 6.3 Neurophenomenology and the Study of Consciousness; 6.4 Affective Neuroscience and Emotion Experience

6.5 Outline of an Affective Neuro-physio-phenomenological Method
6.6 Bodily Feelings and Emotion Experience; 6.7 Conclusion; 7 Feeling Others; 7.1 Introduction; 7.2 The Experience of the Other as a Leib; 7.3 Perceiving Emotion in Expression; 7.4 Impressive Others; 7.5 Feeling Close; 7.6 Sympathy; 7.7 Doing as Others Do; 7.8 Do We Mimic Others to Read Their Minds?; 7.9 Mimicry as a Mechanism for Social Bonding; 7.10 Beyond Strict Mimicry; 7.11 Conclusion; Epilogue; Notes; References; Index

Sommario/riassunto

In *The Feeling Body*, Giovanna Colombetti takes ideas from the enactive approach developed over the last twenty years in cognitive science and philosophy of mind and applies them for the first time to affective science -- the study of emotions, moods, and feelings. She argues that enactivism entails a view of cognition as not just embodied but also intrinsically affective, and she elaborates on the implications of this claim for the study of emotion in psychology and neuroscience. In the course of her discussion, Colombetti focuses on long-debated issues in affective science, including the notion of basic emotions, the nature of appraisal and its relationship to bodily arousal, the place of bodily feelings in emotion experience, the neurophysiological study of emotion experience, and the bodily nature of our encounters with others. Drawing on enactivist tools such as dynamical systems theory, the notion of the lived body, neurophenomenology, and phenomenological accounts of empathy, Colombetti advances a novel approach to these traditional issues that does justice to their complexity. Doing so, she also expands the enactive approach into a further domain of inquiry, one that has more generally been neglected by the embodied-embedded approach in the philosophy of cognitive science.
