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Sommario/riassunto	Contemporary epistemologists seldom focus attention on the nature of warrant; and when they do, they display deplorable diversity. The author argues that none of their claims is correct, and suggests a more satisfactory alternative. He surveys current contributions to the discussion of warrant and neighbouring issues.