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Titolo	Immunity to error through misidentification : new essays // edited by Simon Prosser and Francois Recanati [[electronic resource]]
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Nota di contenuto	; 1. On the thesis that 'I' is not a referring term / John Campbell -- ; 2. Which 'key to all mythologies' about the self?: a note on where the illusions of transcendence come from and how to resist them / Annalisa Coliva -- ; 3. Two takes on the de se / Marina Folescu and James Higginbotham -- ; 4. Immunity to error as an artefact of transition between representational media / Jenann Ismael -- ; 5. Two uses of 'I' as subject? / Beatrice Longuenesse -- ; 6. Immunity to error through misidentification: what does it tell us about the de se? / Daniel Morgan -- ; 7. Action and immunity to error through misidentification / Lucy O'Brien -- ; 8. Explaining de se phenomena / Christopher

Peacocke -- ; 9. Sources of immunity to error through misidentification / Simon Prosser -- ; 10. Immunity to error through misidentification: what it is and where it comes from / Francois Recanati -- ; 11. I and I: immunity to error through misidentification of the subject / Galen Strawson -- ; 12. Bodily immunity to error / Frederique de Vignemont -- ; 13. Reflections on Francois Recanati's 'Immunity to error through misidentification: what it is and where it comes from' / Crispin Wright.

Sommario/riassunto

Immunity to error through misidentification is recognised as an important feature of certain kinds of first-person judgments, as well as arguably being a feature of other indexical or demonstrative judgments. In this collection of newly commissioned essays, the contributors present a variety of approaches to it, engaging with historical and empirical aspects of the subject as well as contemporary philosophical work. It is the first collection of essays devoted exclusively to the topic and will be essential reading for anyone interested in philosophical work on the self, first-person thought or indexical thought more generally.
