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Autore	Hochberg Herbert <1929->
Titolo	Thought, fact, and reference [[electronic resource]] : the origins and ontology of logical atomism // by Herbert Hochberg
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Nota di bibliografia	Includes bibliographical references and indexes.
Nota di contenuto	Preface; Introduction; Table of Contents; I: The Analysis of Perception; II: Idealism, Realism, and Common Sense; III: Thought and Belief; IV: Moore and Bradley on Particulars, Predicates, and Predication; V: Names, Individual Concepts, and Ontological Reduction; VI: Frege's Account of Reference and Thought; VII: Russell's Critique of Frege and the Origin of the Theory of Descriptions; VIII: Descriptions, Substitution, and Intentional Contexts; IX: Existence, Predicates, and Properties; X: Facts and Possibilities; XI: Russell's Theory of Judgment and Sellars's Critique of It XII: The Structure of Thought: Part IXIII: The Structure of Thought: Part II; XIV: Logic, Fact, and Belief; XV: Difference, Existence, and Universality; Notes; Name Index; Subject Index
Sommario/riassunto	Thought, Fact, and Reference was first published in 1978. Against a background of criticism of alternative accounts, Professor Hochberg presents an analysis of thought, reference, and truth within the tradition of logical atomism. He analyzes G. E. Moore's early attack on idealism and examines the influence of Moore on the development of Bertrand Russell's and Ludwig Wittgenstein's logical atomism. He traces

an early divergence between Russell and Wittgenstein, on the one side, and Moore and Gottlob Frege on the other, into variants recently advocated by Wilfrid Sellars, Gustav Bergmann, and o
