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Nota di contenuto	Contents; Acknowledgments; Chapter One: The Problem of Free Will: A Brief Introduction and Outline of Position; 1.1 Hard-Enough Determinism and the Illusion of Free Will; 1.2 Freedom and Determinism: Defining the Problem; 1.3 A Word About Moral Responsibility; Notes; Chapter Two: Against Libertarianism; 2.1 Agent-Causal Accounts of Free Will; 2.2 The Problem of Mental Causation; 2.3 Naturalized Libertarianism: Is Anyone Up For a Role of the Dice?; Notes; Chapter Three: Against Compatibilism; 3.1 Compatibilism and the Consequence Argument; 3.2 The Folk Psychology of Free Will 3.3 The Phenomenology of FreedomNotes; Chapter Four: Consciousness and Free Will (I): Automaticity and the Adaptive Unconscious; 4.1 Is Consciousness Necessary for Free Will?; 4.2 Automaticity and the Adaptive Unconscious; 4.3 The Unbearable Automaticity of Being; 4.4 Implications for Free Will; Notes; Chapter Five: Consciousness and Free Will (II): Transparency, Infallibility, and the Higher-Order Thought Theory; 5.1 Consciousness and Freedom: The Introspective Argument for Free Will; 5.2 Two Concepts of Consciousness; 5.3 The Higher-Order Thought (HOT) Theory of

Consciousness

5.4 Misrepresentation and Confabulation5.5 What the HOT Theory Tells Us About Free Will; 5.6 On the Function of Consciousness; Notes; Chapter Six: Consciousness and Free Will (III): Intentional States, Spontaneity, and Action Initiation; 6.1 The Apparent Spontaneity of Intentional States; 6.2 The Asymmetry Between Intentional States and Sensory States; 6.3 Do Our Conscious Intentions Cause Our Actions?; 6.4 Libet's Findings and the HOT Theory; 6.5 Explaining the Phenomenological Illusion; 6.6 Wegner's Theory of Apparent Mental Causation; Notes

Chapter Seven: Consciousness and Free Will (IV): Self-Consciousness and Our Sense of Agency7.1 When Self-Consciousness Breaks Down; 7.2 Self-Consciousness and Higher-Order Thoughts; 7.3 Errors of Identification, Thought Insertion, and the HOT Theory; 7.4 Accounting for Our Sense of Agency; 7.5 Conclusion; Notes; Works Cited; Index; About the Author

Sommario/riassunto

This book argues two main things: The first is that there is no such thing as free will—at least not in the sense most ordinary folk take to be central or fundamental; the second is that the strong and pervasive belief in free will can be accounted for through a careful analysis of our phenomenology and a proper theoretical understanding of consciousness.
