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Altri autori (Persone)	JohnstonJason Scott
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Nota di contenuto	Introduction / Jason Scott Johnston -- The cost of cartelization : the ipcc process and the crisis of credibility in climate science / Jason Scott Johnston -- Adversarial versus consensus processes for assessing scientific evidence : should the IPCC operate more like a courtroom? / Ross McKittrick -- On the origin of specious species / Rob Roy Ramey II -- Politics and science in endangered species / Katrina Miriam Wyman -- Reconciling the scientific & regulatory timetables / James W. Conrad, Jr -- Improving the use of science to inform environmental regulation / Susan E. Dudley and George M. Gray -- A return to expertise? : a proposal for an institute of scientific assessments / Gary E. Marchant.
Sommario/riassunto	Institutions and Incentives in Regulatory Science explores fundamental problems with regulatory science in the environmental and natural resource law field. Each chapter covers a variety of natural resource and regulatory areas, ranging from climate change to endangered species protection and traditional health-based environmental regulation. The

contributors in this volume address how institutions for regulatory science should be designed in light of the inevitable misfit between the political or legal demand for regulatory action an
