

1. Record Nr.	UNINA9910449794203321
Autore	Newman Andrew <1948->
Titolo	The correspondence theory of truth : an essay on the metaphysics of predication // Andrew Newman [[electronic resource]]
Pubbl/distr/stampa	Cambridge : , : Cambridge University Press, , 2002
ISBN	1-107-12530-8 1-280-41956-3 0-511-17665-1 0-511-04223-X 0-511-15754-1 0-511-30455-2 0-511-49797-0 0-511-04515-8
Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (xii, 251 pages) : digital, PDF file(s)
Collana	Cambridge studies in philosophy
Disciplina	121
Soggetti	Truth - Correspondence theory Language and languages - Philosophy
Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia
Note generali	Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
Nota di bibliografia	Includes bibliographical references (p. 236-243) and index.
Nota di contenuto	; 1. Universals, Predication, and Truth. ; 1.1. The Problem of Universals. ; 1.2. Theories of Universals. ; 1.3. Predication, Participation, and Inherence. ; 1.4. Universals, Truth, and Devitt -- ; 2. The Univocity of Truth. ; 2.1. Horwich and Deflationary Theories of Truth. ; 2.2. Alston and Minimalist Realism about Truth. ; 2.3. The Problem of the Univocity of Truth. ; 2.4. Reality and the Eleatic Principle -- ; 3. The Correspondence Theory for Predicative Sentences. ; 3.1. Difficulties about States of Affairs in the Tractatus. ; 3.2. Truth as Isomorphism between Sentence and State of Affairs. ; 3.3. The Nominalist Account of Atomic Facts. ; 3.4. The Realist Account of Atomic Facts. ; 3.5. Correspondence for Sentences with and without Facts.
Sommario/riassunto	This work presents a version of the correspondence theory of truth based on Wittgenstein's Tractatus and Russell's theory of truth and discusses related metaphysical issues such as predication, facts and

propositions. Like Russell and one prominent interpretation of the Tractatus it assumes a realist view of universals. Part of the aim is to avoid Platonic propositions, and although sympathy with facts is maintained in the early chapters, the book argues that facts as real entities are not needed. It includes discussion of contemporary philosophers such as David Armstrong, William Alston and Paul Horwich, as well as those who write about propositions and facts, and a number of students of Bertrand Russell. It will interest teachers and advanced students of philosophy who are interested in the realistic conception of truth and in issues in metaphysics related to the correspondence theory of truth, and those interested in Russell and the Tractatus.
