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   Sommario/riassunto This SpringerBrief proposes a general framework for reasoning about
                     inconsistency in a wide variety of logics, including inconsistency
                     resolution methods that have not yet been studied. The proposed
                     framework allows users to specify preferences on how to resolve
                     inconsistency when there are multiple ways to do so. This empowers
                     users to resolve inconsistency in data leveraging both their detailed
                     knowledge of the data as well as their application needs. The brief
                     shows that the framework is well-suited to handle inconsistency in
                     several logics, and provides algorithms to compute preferred options.
                     Finally, the brief shows that the framework not only captures several
                     existing works, but also supports reasoning about inconsistency in
                     several logics for which no such methods exist today.