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Autore	De Blasi, Luigi <1919-2008>
Titolo	Dizionario dialettale di San Mango sul Calore (Avellino) / Luigi De Blasi ; presentazione di Gianrenzo P. Clivio ; a cura di Nicola De Blasi
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2. Record Nr.	UNINA9910255446503321
Autore	McMann Kelly M. <1970->
Titolo	Corruption as a Last Resort : Adapting to the Market in Central Asia / / Kelly M. McMann
Pubbl/distr/stampa	Ithaca, NY, : Cornell University Press, 2014 Ithaca : , : Cornell University Press, , 2014 ©2014
ISBN	9780801454905 0801454905 9780801454912 0801454913
Edizione	[1st ed.]
Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (201 p.)
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Soggetti	Post-communism - Economic aspects - Asia, Central Political corruption - Asia, Central Corruption - Asia, Central Asia, Central Politics and government 1991- Asia, Central Economic conditions 1991-
Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
Formato	Materiale a stampa
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Note generali	Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph
Nota di bibliografia	Includes bibliographical references and index.
Nota di contenuto	An absence of alternatives : a new framework for understanding corruption -- Alternatives to corruption and the impact of market reform : the arguments and their theoretical implications -- Bribery, favoritism, and clientelism : evidence from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan -- Market actors as an unrealized alternative : the impact of market reforms -- Islamic institutions and secular charities : obstacles to providing substitute resources -- Families : the uneven impact of market reforms -- Reducing corruption : policy recommendations -- Appendix : statistical analysis.
Sommario/riassunto	Why do ordinary people engage in corruption? Kelly M. McMann contends that bureaucrats, poverty, and culture do not force individuals in Central Asia to pay bribes, use connections, or sell political support. Rather, corruption is a last resort when relatives, groups in society, the

market, and formal government programs cannot provide essential goods and services. Using evidence from her long-term research in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, McMann shows that Islamic institutions, secular charities, entrepreneurs, and banks cannot provide the jobs and credit people need. This drives individuals to illicitly seek employment and loans from government officials. A leading cause of this resource scarcity is market reform, as demonstrated by McMann's analysis of these countries as well as of Uzbekistan and global data. Market reform without supporting institutions, such as credit registries and antimonopoly measures, limits the resources available from the market and societal groups. McMann finds that in these circumstances only those individuals who have affluent relatives have an alternative to corruption. By focusing on ordinary people, McMann offers a new understanding of corruption. Previously, our knowledge was largely restricted to government officials' role in illicit exchanges. From her novel approach comes a useful policy insight: supplying ordinary people with alternatives to corruption is a fundamental and important anticorruption strategy.
